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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine how regulation by a central 
authority motivates changes in behavior.  
Chapter 1 identifies the role of a tolerance policy as a manager’s regulatory 
mechanism which can deter worker misconduct in rank-order tournaments. When 
contestants’ actions cannot be perfectly monitored or doing so is prohibitively costly, 
misconduct takes place. This chapter develops a theoretical model in which contestants 
compete for a prize in a symmetric tournament and in which the organizer tolerates some 
level of misconduct. In addition to showing that zero tolerance does not minimize 
equilibrium misconduct, it also shows there exists a range of tolerance levels where a 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which players engage in malfeasance (i.e. 
misconduct above the tolerated level) with some probability.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 study  how a patentholder’s decision to license a clean technology 
to firms differs under alternative regulatory instruments (either an emissions tax or 
tradable permits). They are the first theoretical analyses to explicitly account for 
oligopolistic behavior in the product market and to endogenize the patentholder’s optimal 
licensing decision under environmental policy.   
Chapter 2 assumes that the number of firms in the oligopoly is fixed. In contrast to 
what is generally found in the environmental literature, the results show that, for at least 
some range of innovation, a permit policy motivates the patentholder to license to more 
firms than he would under an equivalent emissions tax. This is because, for this range of 
innovation, the optimal licensing policy of the innovator is to auction a sufficiently large 
  vii 
number of licenses so that the market becomes concentrated. For an equivalent tax and 
permit policy, it is more ‘difficult’ to concentrate the market under the latter since non-
licensees can free-ride off of the reduction in permit price that occurs when more licenses 
are auctioned.  
Chapter 3 is a natural extension of Chapter 2 by allowing free entry of non-licensees. 
The results are analogous to those in the previous chapter although the intuition differs. 
In Chapter 3, the innovator auctions enough licenses in order to deter entry by a 
potentially limitless number of non-licensees.   
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CHAPTER 1: MINIMIZING MISCONDUCT IN TOURNAMENTS 
BY TOLERATING IT 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Competition can foster misconduct in any circumstance where the organizer of a 
contest cannot perfectly monitor contestants’ actions or when doing so is prohibitively 
costly. Cheating or doping in contests has received much recent study (Berentsen, 2002; 
Krakel, 2007; Stowe & Gilpatric, 2010; Gilpatric, 2011). From doping in sports to fraud 
by sales staff competing for promotion, there are actions that competitors can take which 
improve performance and make winning more likely, but which are contrary to the 
interest of the organizer and are therefore prohibited.
1
 But should an organizer prohibit all 
behavior he does not want contestants to engage in? Does doing so minimize the extent 
of misconduct that will in fact take place when enforcement is imperfect?  
Consider a firm that motivates its sales staff through competition. These staff may use 
varying degrees of aggressiveness in their sales tactics to pressure customers into making 
a purchase, ranging from standard “hard sell” practices to sales fraud, and at least beyond 
some point the benefits to the firm of making a sale may be outweighed by reputational 
and other costs to the firm. That is, at some point (and beyond), such behavior is deemed 
                                                 
 
1
 Examples of general misconduct include scientists and academics misrepresenting research to attain 
grants (Sovacool, 2006), firms falsifying documents to obtain patents first, and teachers inflating student 
achievement test scores to ensure funding (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). The current paper addresses those 
instances in which misconduct is generally tolerated by the organizers of the tournament. 
  2 
undesirable by the firm.
2
  But the individual may nevertheless be motivated to use such 
sales tactics if doing so is sufficiently likely to be the margin of victory that earns a bonus 
or promotion. Such behavior that improves a contestant’s performance but is undesirable 
for the organizer I term “misconduct”. 
In this paper I determine the equilibrium level of misconduct chosen by players in a 
symmetric rank-order tournament between two competitors in which the organizer 
tolerates some level of misconduct. I assume that misconduct exists on a continuum, with 
different levels representing a variety of actions which are deemed undesirable by the 
tournament organizer.
3
  Higher levels of misconduct yield greater performance 
improvement, but also a higher probability of being detected.  
In this context, I show that although all misconduct is (by construction) undesirable 
from the organizer’s perspective, this does not imply it is best to prohibit all such 
behavior and punish it (when detected) with disqualification in a contest. In fact, 
tolerating some level of misconduct, so only behavior beyond some point constitutes 
“malfeasance” or “cheating” which brings with it the punishment of disqualification, may 
reduce misconduct in competition. My central finding is that it is not optimal to prohibit 
behavior that cannot effectively be deterred under the enforcement mechanism (i.e., 
undesirable actions which competitors will engage in despite their being prohibited). In 
particular, the ‘line’ that defines when misconduct ought to be prohibited is best drawn 
                                                 
 
2
 One can think of worker behavior being on a continuum and that there exists some point on this 
continuum past which the employer deems behavior to be undesirable (i.e., the worker ‘crosses a line’). 
This point (and above it) is considered misconduct by the employer. I do not model when (and why) an 
employer believes such behavior constitutes misconduct.  
3
 I do not model a single, undesirable action that increases in severity along the continuum. Rather,  the 
continuum represents an assortment of undesirable actions (e.g., pressuring customers versus sales fraud).  
  3 
not where behavior is deemed undesirable (i.e., should not be drawn at zero) but rather 
where it is no longer worthwhile for the contestant to cross it, given what is tolerated. 
My finding that tolerating some degree of misconduct may reduce the extent that it 
occurs in competition is analogous to findings regarding “marginal deterrence” in the 
enforcement literature that began with the work of Becker (1968). This rational 
deterrence framework assumes that the choice to engage in misconduct is a matter of 
weighing the potential benefits against the potential costs. However, for my case in which 
misconduct is not a dichotomous choice to do so or not but rather a matter of degree, the 
principal of marginal deterrence, as first discussed by Stigler (1970), pertains. Shavell 
(1992) describes marginal deterrence as the tendency of an individual to be deterred from 
committing a severely harmful act due to the difference, or margin, between the expected 
sanction for it and a less harmful act. Mookherjee and Png (1994) develop a general 
enforcement model in which potential violators choose from a continuum of acts of 
increasing severity. They find that the optimal penalty increases with an act’s severity, 
but that optimal marginal penalties are always less than marginal harm. Further, they 
show that it may be optimal to apply no punishment to acts of a severity below some 
point in order to more effectively deter more serious acts. That is, some harmful acts are 
best tolerated. 
Unlike the standard decision-making environments of rational enforcement models, a 
competition is a strategic environment in which the degree of misconduct is determined 
by contestants best-responding to the expected misconduct of competitors. This is an 
important difference between my model and prior work on marginal deterrence. Another 
critical feature of a tournament is that the primary punishment is likely to be 
  4 
disqualification, which lends to an inherently dichotomous enforcement outcome and 
thus limits the possibility of marginal sanctions for increasing degrees of misconduct. In 
my tournament setting, if the level of tolerance is sufficiently high, the expected payoff 
from choosing the tolerated level of misconduct is greater than the expected payoff from 
engaging in the  higher level of misconduct that arises under a “zero tolerance” 
enforcement policy. That is, for some tolerated level below the level of misconduct that 
would arise if any detected misconduct precipitates disqualification, the equilibrium of 
the game is for competitors to engage in only tolerated behavior and not exhibit 
malfeasance. 
In addition to showing that zero tolerance does not minimize the level of misconduct 
in equilibrium, I show that as the tolerated level increases there exists a range where the 
symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Players choose to commit malfeasance with 
some probability. As the tolerated level increases on this range the probability of 
malfeasance declines, as does the expected level of misconduct, although the level of 
misconduct that players engage in when they do commit malfeasance increases with the 
tolerated level.    
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
cheating in tournaments and my contribution in this context. Section 1.3 presents the 
theoretical model. The equilibria are established in Section 1.4 and an analytical 
comparison between zero tolerance and a leniency policy is examined in Section 1.5. 
Section 1.6 concludes with a discussion of the results, limitations of the model, and 
proposed extensions. 
  5 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
Cheating in contests has generally been modeled in the context of tournament theory 
which originated with the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983). The models discussed here assume all misconduct is prohibited and 
therefore treat any chosen level of misconduct as ‘cheating’ or malfeasance.4 As in all 
tournament models, contestants compete with one another for a fixed, pre-specified prize 
and the contestant with the highest relative output wins (i.e., he who ranks first wins). 
Generally, output is subject to randomness and is increased by a player’s choice of work 
effort and misconduct. To deter misconduct, the organizer of the tournament institutes an 
(imperfect) enforcement policy which includes an audit (i.e., inspection) probability and a 
detection technology. The detection technology represents the probability that a 
contestant is caught engaging in misconduct, if audited. If caught, the contestant is 
immediately disqualified from the tournament (aka ‘zero-tolerance’).  
The literature examining cheating in tournaments has often focused on minimum 
enforcement costs or minimum audit probabilities necessary to induce the no-cheating 
equilibrium.
5
 Assuming two symmetric players that each chooses effort and whether to 
cheat or not (i.e., a dichotomous choice), Curry and Mongrain (2009) differentiate 
between the enforcement policy (audit probability, detection technology, and the outside 
sanction) and the prize structure (limited liability, win by default, and the prize spread) 
and ask if changes in the prize spread can act as a deterrent to misconduct. They argue 
                                                 
 
4
 This is in contrast to the model I propose in which malfeasance occurs only when a contestant engages in 
misconduct above the tolerated level.  
5
 All models discussed here assume two risk-neutral players that compete strategically by simultaneously 
choosing work and/or cheating, unless otherwise noted. 
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that in most tournament settings, limited liability exists such that the sanction, if caught 
cheating, is no more than the value of the prize awarded. Consequently, changes in the 
prize structure are analogous to changes in the expected penalty. The authors conclude 
that increases in the value of the first- and second-place prize, without changing the prize 
spread, decreases the minimum audit probability required to deter cheating. The proposed 
rationale is that without a change in the prize spread there is no effect on effort, but a 
change in the first-place prize increases the expected penalty of cheating. They also find 
that although winning by default reduces equilibrium effort, it also reduces minimum 
monitoring costs.  
In contrast, Berentsen (2002) allows asymmetry between two players that compete in 
a sporting contest. Each contestant decides whether or not to take a performance-
enhancing drug before the event. He finds that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the 
favorite has a higher incentive to cheat. The main focus of the model is on a ranking-
based sanction scheme whereby the penalty, if caught, is based on a player’s ranking. He 
finds that such a scheme can induce the no-cheating equilibrium at lower enforcement 
costs. He also shows that if contestants are symmetric, then the decision to cheat or not is 
analogous to the Prisoner Dilemma’s game whereby it would always be in the players’ 
best interests to coordinate and not cheat. Yet, the potential increase in payoff from 
deviated to cheating results in both players choosing cheating in equilibrium and each 
receiving lower payoffs.  
Similarly, Krakel (2007) also models two asymmetric players that compete by 
choosing output and a binary choice of cheating or not. Both effort and cheating are 
complements in production and incur direct costs; while getting caught cheating incurs 
  7 
additional indirect ‘reputation’ costs.  He finds that whether or not a player decides to 
cheat depends on the interaction of three effects. The first, the likelihood effect, 
represents the increase in the probability of winning when the opponent does not cheat 
and has a positive effect on cheating incentives. The second, the cost effect, and the third 
effect, the base-salary effect, place downward pressure on the incentive to cheat. The cost 
effect is the increase in costs from cheating while the base-salary effect is the reduction in 
the base salary if caught cheating. Krakel shows that  the larger is the degree of 
asymmetry  or the error term, the more likely no cheating occurs in equilibrium. In terms 
of the asymmetry, he finds that when both players either cheat or both do no cheat, the 
favorite will always choose higher equilibrium levels of effort; and that ex-ante testing 
relative to ex-post testing always leads to larger equilibrium effort.  
Likewise Stowe and Gilpatric (2010) model two asymmetric players (a ‘leader’ and a 
‘trailer’) that simultaneously choose whether to cheat. They find that the leader has a 
higher (lower) incentive to cheat for sufficiently low (high) audit probabilities. Further, 
they also discover that correlated audits (either both players are audited or both are not) 
decrease the incidence of cheating in the mixed strategy relative to uncorrelated audits. 
This is because, if both players cheat and are audited under correlated audits, then both 
are disqualified. Under uncorrelated audits, if both players cheat, an opponent may be the 
only one audited. Therefore, the expected payoff to cheating under correlated audits is 
smaller. The authors also find that if the tournament organizer can employ differential 
auditing (each player is audited with their own probability), then the no-cheating 
equilibrium is induced at a lower cost.   
  8 
Rather than modeling the choice of misconduct as dichotomous, Gilpatric (2011) 
allows misconduct to lie on a continuum. He models   symmetric players that choose 
misconduct and work effort, and explores how changes in the parameters of the 
tournament alter equilibrium cheating and effort. He includes a detection technology in 
which the probability of being caught if audited is increasing in the degree of misconduct. 
This is the general framework I will employ as well. Interestingly, he finds that although 
higher monitoring reduces cheating, it can also lead to reductions in effort.  Similar to 
Stowe and Gilpatric (2010), correlated audits deter cheating more than uncorrelated 
audits. Further, allowing a runner-up to win by default also reduces the incentive to cheat.  
In contrast to the above models, I allow another aspect of tournaments – tolerance of 
low levels of misconduct – to be included in the model, and show that it can act as a 
better deterrent to misconduct than zero-tolerance under imperfect enforcement. I  believe 
that including tolerance is an important step toward understanding a contestant’s choice 
between misconduct and malfeasance and in understanding the behavior of tournament 
organizers.
6
 Although there are a variety of reasons that contest organizers may tolerate 
some minor levels of misconduct (e.g., punishment is costly or agents may be given 
“benefit of the doubt” when evidence is weak), I find that they may do this because it 
motivates contestants to choose the relatively low level of tolerated behavior instead of a 
higher level of misconduct that would be chosen under zero tolerance. The idea that 
managers can reduce misconduct by partially tolerating it is perhaps counterintuitive, but 
my model demonstrates why this is the case. 
                                                 
 
6
 For example, my model provides intuition as to why managers may explicitly allow their employees to 
engage in less severe levels of misconduct without penalizing them. 
  9 
1.3 Model of Cheating 
  
I set up a tournament model in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981) in which two 
identical risk-neutral contestants,        compete in a contest to win a pre-specified 
prize by choosing some level of misconduct. Higher levels of misconduct lead to an 
increased probability of winning but also higher probabilities of disqualification. Given 
that my focus is on misconduct, I abstract from the choice of work effort since 
equilibrium misconduct is independent of equilibrium work effort (Gilpatric, 2011).
7
 The 
tournament organizer tolerates minor levels of misconduct so that a contestant is 
disqualified if observed misconduct is higher than what is allowable. Misconduct in 
excess of the tolerated level is considered cheating or malfeasance.  Therefore, although 
higher levels of misconduct lead to increases in the probability of ranking first, observed 
malfeasance is met with disqualification.  The discrete change in the probability of 
disqualification from choosing malfeasance over the tolerated level drives equilibrium 
behavior and allows me to identify the level of tolerance which invokes the minimum 
equilibrium level of misconduct.  
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the tournament organizer announces the 
payoffs and the tolerated level of behavior. Second, contestants choose a level of 
misconduct taking into account their beliefs about what their opponents will choose. In 
this stage, output and rankings are realized. In the final stage,  the tournament organizer 
(or an outside regulatory body) audits players with some fixed probability and may detect 
cheating, where a cheating player is met with disqualification. I define the organizer’s 
                                                 
 
7
 However, effort is not independent of misconduct. In particular, equilibrium effort is a function of the 
equilibrium probability of being caught (Gilpatric, 2011).  
  10 
enforcement policy as one that consists of an audit probability, the detection technology, 
and disqualification as the form of punishment.  
Formally, consider misconduct as lying on a continuum,          , representing a 
continuum of undesirable actions of increasing severity (not an increasing level of a 
single activity). To deter misconduct, the tournament organizer chooses a tolerated level, 
    . Note that the tolerated level may possibly be zero. The organizer also sets the 
payoffs, with the winner of the contest receiving   while the loser receives    with   
    . The prize spread is then        . 
Then, each contestant chooses some level of misconduct,          , which increases 
output,   . Output also depends on randomness,         , where        
  .8  Define 
        and let      be the cumulative distribution of   with corresponding pdf     . 
Then, the probability that player   has a higher output than player   is         . Note 
that a higher output does not necessarily translate into “winning” the contest due to 
possible disqualification. 
Once output is observed, the tournament organizer, or an outside regulatory body, 
audits players with a fixed probability,    under a correlated audit scheme. Correlated 
audits mean that either both players are audited or both are not. This is in contrast to 
uncorrelated audits in which each player is audited with independent probabilities. 
Gilpatric and Stowe (2010) and Gilpatric (2011) compare equilibrium cheating levels 
                                                 
 
8
 I assume randomness in output is observed after misconduct is chosen.  
  11 
chosen under correlated vs. uncorrelated audits and find that correlated audits are more 
effective at deterring cheating when full deterrence is not possible.
9
 
When an audit occurs, the probability that a player is caught engaging in misconduct, 
      is nonnegative and increasing in                      ;         and 
        
       10  If     , he is not punished. On the other hand, if     , he is 
disqualified, with the first place winnings automatically going to the other player if the 
other player is not also disqualified. Therefore, the probability of being disqualified given 
that an audit has occurred is represented by the following piecewise function:  
 
      
 
      
         
       
 
 
Note that I do not assume that an audit fully reveals the actions of the contestants. Rather, 
an audit has some probability of discovering some prohibited action engaged in by a 
contestant. Obviously, there is no reason for an auditor to search for evidence of actions 
which are permissible. The increasing   functions reflects the assumption that actions of 
greater severity (and correspondingly greater impact on output) are more easily 
detectable. Thus, the assumption that      yields zero probability of disqualification 
while      yields strictly positive probability of detection does not imply that the audit 
                                                 
 
9
 In a recent paper by Curry and Mongrain (2009), the authors allow the audit probability of the winner to 
be higher than the audit probability of the loser. They find that this decreases the incentive to cheat and 
therefore the  minimum monitoring costs required to deter cheating decreases. Such an audit probability 
applied to the present model would produce analogous results and would not alter the main results found  
here.  
10
 To ensure an interior solution with equilibrium misconduct greater than zero I assume that 
       
      .  
  12 
probability can fully reveal the level or extent of a single activity, but rather reflects the 
fact that values of   above   are different actions than those below  . 
 Note also that in this model the only punishment is disqualification. I disregard the 
possibility of an outside sanction which some of the existing literature has considered. 
The exclusion of an outside sanction simplifies the analysis and allows me to fully 
capture what I view as an important characteristic of tournaments– that disqualification is 
the central form of punishment and outside sanctions are limited.
11
 This constrains the 
ability of the organizer to achieve marginal deterrence.   
1.4 Equilibrium 
 
Players simultaneously choose    to maximize expected payoffs. Since   
      , 
equilibrium misconduct will always be greater than zero, even when    . Note that it is 
never optimal for a contestant to choose misconduct below the tolerated level since, for 
any           , the marginal benefit of    is positive while the marginal cost is zero. Let 
expected payoffs be             for each player in each case,  : 
(1) If both players engage in malfeasance, then 
 
                                        
                                      
[1.1] 
 
                                                 
 
11
 Although contestants that are caught cheating may incur costs that are outside the scope of the 
tournament (e.g., reputation costs), I abstract from such penalties. My focus is on those penalties that are 
under the control of the tournament organizer. 
  13 
Player  ’s expected payoff is symmetric. Equation [1.1] is analogous to the expected 
payoff in Gilpatric (2011), where the first component represents player  ’s payoff when 
both contestants are audited but neither are caught and go head to head; and the second is 
the payoff when player   wins by default. The third component represents the payoff 
from going head to head because no audit has occurred.  
(2) For the asymmetric case, without loss of generality, assume   cheats and   does 
not, then  
 
                                                [1.2] 
 
 
                                              
                      
[1.3] 
 
 
  
The main difference between [1.2] and [1.1] is that there is no chance for   to win by 
default.  In this case, when   does not cheat, he may still compete on output if his 
opponent is not caught although the probability of ranking first is less than one-half. On 
the other hand, he may win by default. 
(3) If both players choose the tolerated level, then 
 
                     [1.4] 
 
Player  ’s expected payoff is identical. When both players choose the tolerated level, the 
winner is determined by whichever realizes a higher error,  .  
  14 
For cases one and two, the optimal level of misconduct is determined by using the 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept. If player   believes   is going to cheat with 
probability one, and if player   responds by cheating, then   anticipates receiving the 
expected payoff in equation [1.1]. Player   follows a similar strategy, so that the 
symmetric NE level of misconduct,   , is determined by the first-order conditions of 
equation [1.1] and by imposing symmetry:  
 
              
  
     
  
 
         
  
         [1.5] 
 
That is,         is the unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, given that both 
players engage in malfeasance. Corresponding equilibrium profits are           
 
           
 
 
 
   . Likewise, without loss of generality, if player   believes   is going to 
choose the tolerated level with probability one, then player  ’s best response is 
determined by the first-order condition of equation [1.2]:  
 
                  
     
  
       
         
[1.6] 
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Equation [1.6] implicitly defines     which is the optimal level of misconduct chosen by 
the cheating player,    given that he believes his opponent chooses   with probability 
one.
12
 Finally, if both players choose the tolerated level, each earns         
 
 
   . 
Although the strategy space of each player is        , I distinguish equilibria as 
dependent on the level of tolerance. This idea is represented in a reduced manner as a 
payoff matrix in Table 1.
13
 The first (second) element in each cell is player  ’s ( ’s) 
expected payoff in each case, accounting for the NE level of misconduct when 
applicable.
14
 Therefore, the cell in the upper left corner represents expected payoffs when 
both players choose    while the cell in the lower right corresponds to the expected 
payoffs when both players  correctly believe the other will cheat with probability one, 
and are therefore best responding to these beliefs (i.e., choose the NE level   ).The 
remaining two cells represent the expected payoffs in the asymmetric cases in which, if a 
player engages in malfeasance and has beliefs that his opponent is choosing the tolerated 
level, then he best responds by choosing   . So, for example, the cell in the lower right is 
the case for which player   believes   will choose the tolerated level so then   
earns         while   earns           . 
 
 
                                                 
 
12
 It is not necessarily true that a pure strategy asymmetric equilibrium exists in this range. Nonetheless, I 
solve for    because it provides insight on how the equilibrium level of misconduct chosen in the 
symmetric mixing strategy changes. 
13
 Note that for some of the cells, a continuous choice problem is occurring where players are choosing 
misconduct from a continuum, given that their opponent is cheating (i.e., southeast cell) or given that their 
opponent is choosing the tolerated level (i.e., northeast and southwest cells). This table merely represents, 
in a reduced form, the dichotomous choice between malfeasance or not. 
14
 For example, the upper left cell does not represent NE but rather what each player would earn if they 
both choose the tolerated level. 
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Table 1: Expected Payoffs 
   
Player   
  
  
Optimal 
Malfeasance 
Player   
                                       
Optimal Malfeasance                                          
 
 
 
 
 
I further characterize the equilibrium as a function of the tolerated level, for a given 
enforcement policy.  For sufficiently high levels of tolerance, it is a dominant strategy for 
each player to choose the tolerated level, so that       is the equilibrium. From player  ’s 
perspective, this requires that, given player   chooses the tolerated level, the expected 
payoff from choosing the tolerated level is larger than the expected payoff from engaging 
in malfeasance at   ,                  , which can be simplified as  
 
                      [1.7] 
 
The same is true for player    When [1.7] holds with equality,  , the minimum tolerated 
level required to induce the symmetric tolerance equilibrium,      , is implicitly defined. 
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Likewise, both players will choose    for sufficiently low levels of tolerance. For 
        to be the equilibrium requires that the expected payoff from choosing    is larger 
than the expected payoff from choosing   ,                      . This reduces to  
 
           
 
                      [1.8] 
 
When [1.8] holds with equality,   is implicitly defined. This defines the maximum level 
of tolerance for which symmetric malfeasance,         is the equilibrium.  
For those levels of tolerance that lie between   and  , there exists a symmetric mixing 
strategy where each player engages in malfeasance with probability    and chooses    if 
he engages in malfeasance where    is the level of misconduct that maximizes the 
expected payoff from malfeasance,   .  
Formally, the equilibrium mixing strategy chosen by each player leaves his opponent 
indifferent between choosing the tolerated level and choosing to engage in a unique level 
of malfeasance.
 15
  To see this, consider a mixing strategy of a player as one that 
randomizes over two actions -  to choose the tolerated level or to engage in some level of 
malfeasance. Without loss of generality, player   chooses a probability of engaging in 
malfeasance,     that leaves his opponent indifferent between choosing the tolerated level 
and engaging in malfeasance,  
                                                 
 
15
 That is, if a player cheats, there is not a range of malfeasance for which the player  is indifferent between 
any value in it and the tolerated level. The only indifference exists for some unique level of malfeasance, 
which I define as     Thus, the equilibrium mixing strategy represents the probability distribution of 
engaging in malfeasance or not, over the tolerated level and a unique level of malfeasance. 
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The term on the left-hand side of the equality are the expected payoffs accruing to   from 
malfeasance while the right-hand side of the equality are the expected payoffs from 
choosing the tolerated level. Solving for    yields the probability that   will engage in 
malfeasance for a range of misconduct levels,             ,  
Then, note that for any belief about what an opponent will do, there exists a unique 
level of malfeasance that is a best-response for each player. Thus, again without loss of 
generality, if player   believes   will engage in malfeasance with probability   , then 
player  , if he also chooses to engage in malfeasance, will solve the following 
maximization problem,  
 
   
  
                             
 
which yields first-order conditions with solution             : 
 
   
          
   
       
          
   
    
 
Imposing symmetry amongst the players and simultaneously solving yields a unique 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,        : 
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[1.9] 
and 
   
                   
                                        
  [1.10] 
 
where, again,    and    represent the equilibrium probability of malfeasance and the 
level of malfeasance chosen by a player if he does engage in malfeasance, respectively. 
In this case, the expected profits from the mixed strategy are comprised of that 
portion due to both players cheating,     
            one player cheating and the other 
not,                                       and from both players choosing 
the tolerated level,       
        : 
 
        
                             
                          
          
[1.11] 
 
Proposition 1 summarizes the symmetric equilibrium play as a function of the tolerated 
level. 
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Proposition 1.1: For a given enforcement policy, when     , both players 
engage in malfeasance with probability one and each optimally chooses   . When 
    , both players do not engage in malfeasance and choose the tolerated level, 
  . For those values of tolerance that lie between the two calculated thresholds, 
        , each player engages in malfeasance with probability    and chooses 
   if they do engage in malfeasance. [See Appendix A for all proofs]. 
 
It is intuitive that different regions of tolerance lead to alternative equilibria. When 
the tolerated level is too low,    , both players find it in their best interest to engage in 
malfeasance with probability one and choose   . Interestingly, when    , the decision 
to engage in malfeasance or not is parallel to the prisoner’s dilemma game. To see this, 
reconsider Table 1 which illustrates the different payoffs. If it were possible, it would 
always be better for both players to coordinate and choose the tolerated level, as these 
profits are always greater than when both players cheat (i.e.,                  ).  
On the other extreme, sufficiently high levels of tolerance,     , induce players to 
choose the level of misconduct,  . That is, tolerating a sufficient level of misconduct 
reduces the gain from malfeasance enough to allow players to coordinate on non-
malfeasance.  
When,          it is not either player’s best response to engage in malfeasance with 
probability one or choose the tolerated level with probability one. Therefore, each player 
randomizes over choosing to engage in either a unique level of malfeasance       or 
choosing the tolerated level. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of Proposition 1. 
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1.5 The Effect of  Tolerance on Equilibrium Misconduct 
 
I have shown that as the level of tolerance increases, the expected payoff from 
malfeasance falls such that players are more likely to choose the tolerated level rather 
than engage in malfeasance. Consequently, for sufficiently high levels of tolerance, both 
players will optimally choose the tolerated level. 
 
Proposition 1.2: For any enforcement policy, there exists a level of tolerance,  , 
that is less than the level of misconduct that would be chosen under zero 
tolerance,   , such that   is the equilibrium. 
 
Consider the case under zero tolerance so that each contestant chooses   . Setting the 
tolerated level slightly below    means that a player can, by choosing the tolerated level, 
experience a discrete drop in the probability of disqualification at the expense of a very 
insignificant fall in the probability of ranking first, even when his opponent best responds 
by engaging in malfeasance. This is an example of the principal of marginal deterrence. 
Namely, a contestant is deterred from engaging in   as the tolerated level rises to a 
  
                      
0   
  
  
 
Figure 1: Symmetric Equilibria as a Function of the Tolerated Level 
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sufficient degree because the penalty associated with engaging in malfeasance (i.e., 
disqualification) is larger than the penalty associated with choosing the tolerated level 
(i.e., zero penalty). 
With each region of tolerance that supports the various equilibria, I can calculate how 
the tolerated level changes the expected level of equilibrium misconduct,        where 
 
       
             
                         
            
  
 
For those tolerated levels that support the pure strategy cheating equilibrium,          
increases in the tolerated level have no effect on the expected level of equilibrium 
misconduct. This is because, in this region, the tolerated level does not factor into the 
choice of a player’s equilibrium misconduct. In other words, in this region, players 
engage in malfeasance with probability one, and the tolerated level plays no role. 
Naturally, for those levels of tolerance that support the pure strategy no cheating 
equilibrium,            chosen misconduct rises with the tolerated level. 
Determining the effect of increasing the tolerated level on the mixing strategy is more 
complex. For those tolerated levels that support the mixed strategy equilibrium,    
     , the tolerated level not only affects the probability of malfeasance but also the level 
of misconduct, if cheating does occur: 
 
  23 
Lemma 1.1: Within the region of tolerated levels that support the mixed strategy 
equilibrium,        , the probability of malfeasance falls as   increases , 
   
  
    If        the level of misconduct chosen if malfeasance occurs rises 
with  , 
   
  
    If        the level of malfeasance chosen if cheating occurs 
falls as   increases , 
   
  
    
 
As the tolerated level rises, the likelihood of either player engaging in malfeasance 
always falls, 
   
  
    Recall that a player chooses    to leave his opponent indifferent  
between engaging in malfeasance and not. When the tolerated level rises, the opponent’s 
expected payoff from choosing the tolerated level rises. To ensure the opponent’s 
indifference between choosing malfeasance and the tolerated level, a player must lower 
his probability of engaging in malfeasance.  
From the first-order conditions in equations [1.8] and [1.9] that define    and   , 
respectively, it is apparent that    lies between them, although determining whether 
     or       requires specifying functional forms. The import of the  ranking of    
and    becomes apparent when considering the effect of the tolerated level on the level of 
misconduct chosen, 
   
  
  . That is, whether or not equilibrium misconduct falls or rises 
depends on the relative ranking of    and   . To see this, consider the perspective of 
player  . As the tolerated level rises, the likelihood that his opponent is going to cheat 
falls, 
   
  
    Consequently, as    becomes smaller and approaches zero, it implies that 
 , if he decides to cheat, is choosing a level of misconduct that approaches   . This is 
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because, as stated earlier,    is determined by a weighted average of the first-order 
conditions that determine    and   . Therefore, if        increases in the tolerated level, 
and subsequent decreases in the probability of malfeasance, imply that    rises towards 
  . On the other hand, if       , increases in the tolerated level, and subsequent 
decreases in the probability of malfeasance, imply that    falls towards   . 
Because of this ambiguity regarding the effect of the tolerated level on   , I am 
unable to obtain an analytical solution to  
      
  
 for        . Therefore, I rely on 
numerical simulations and find that 
      
  
   even if 
   
  
 falls.
16
 That is, as the tolerated 
level rises in the region that supports the mixing strategy, the fall in the probability of 
malfeasance is sufficiently large enough to outweigh any change in the level of 
equilibrium malfeasance chosen given that a player decides to cheat. That is, the expected 
level of equilibrium misconduct falls.  
In particular, I specify that (i) the error term is uniformly distributed,           ,  
(ii) the range of possible misconduct lies between zero and one,         , and (iii) the 
probability detection function is quadratic,        .  Figure 2 compares the expected 
value of equilibrium misconduct for a low audit probability case        versus a high 
probability case       .17 
  
                                                 
 
16
 In general, I find that        implying that 
   
  
  . That 
      
  
   even when      means that the 
fall in the probability of malfeasance, 
   
  
  is sufficiently large enough to outweigh the increase in the level 
of equilibrium misconduct chosen, if a player decides to cheat, 
   
  
. 
17
 Similar graphs are produced for                      , and           
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Misconduct for a Uniform Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the expected level of misconduct is falling in the region that 
supports the mixed strategy. It also shows that the level of tolerance that minimizes 
expected equilibrium misconduct is greater than zero and is significantly below   . That 
is, consider the       case, which is represented by the solid line. The third vertical 
dotted line moving from the origin and along the horizontal axis is the calculated 
tolerance threshold,          and the fourth dotted line is         . As   moves 
from the origin and approaches  , the expected payoff from choosing the tolerated level 
begins to rise relative to the expected payoff from choosing malfeasance, given that the 
opponent is engaging in malfeasance. At  , a player is indifferent between the two. As   
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increases beyond  , a player decreases the probability of engaging in malfeasance in 
order to keep his opponent indifferent between engaging in malfeasance and not. The 
simulations indicate that as the level of tolerance rises in this region, the probability of 
malfeasance drops  significantly enough that the expected value of misconduct falls (even 
when the level of misconduct chosen, if a player cheats, rises). Finally, as   approaches    
the probability of engaging in malfeasance falls to zero, and both players choose the 
tolerated level.  
Proposition 1.2 is also illustrated. Under zero tolerance the level of misconduct is 
          , but the organizer can minimize misconduct by setting the tolerated level 
at          . In fact, this shows that the organizer can induce a significant fall in 
misconduct by tolerating it at level   . A similar story can be told for the high probability 
case,     .  
1.6 Conclusion 
 
When enforcement is imperfect, competition motivates contestants to engage in 
misconduct. This is particularly true in rank-order tournaments because small increases in 
output can lead to significant increases in the probability of ranking first. Although 
misconduct is undesirable from the tournament organizer’s perspective, it is quite 
possible that it is best to punish only contestants that engage in sufficiently high levels of 
misconduct. That is, it may be in the best interest of the tournament organizer to tolerate 
misconduct up to some level, but punish contestants for any sufficiently high observed 
misconduct. The intuition follows from the principal of marginal deterrence which 
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indicates that a contestant’s incentive to engage in severely harmful acts is reduced if the 
expected sanction is for a less harmful act is reduced or eliminated.  
In regards to my model, any level of misconduct that is at or below the tolerated level 
has an expected penalty of zero (i.e., no possibility of disqualification). In contrast, any 
level of misconduct above that which is tolerated is met with a discrete increase in the 
possibility of disqualification, motivating contestants to choose the tolerated level. I also 
determined that there is a range of tolerated levels that result in a symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibrium where each player chooses to engage in malfeasance with some 
probability. In this range, as the level of tolerance rises, the probability of malfeasance 
falls, although, if players do cheat, they choose higher levels of misconduct. Numerical 
simulations provide evidence that as the tolerated level rises in this region, the expected 
level of equilibrium misconduct falls. Broadly speaking, these theoretical results provide 
intuition behind managers’ decisions to allow less severe levels of misconduct to take 
place in the workplace – under imperfect enforcement, tolerance lowers equilibrium 
misconduct. 
The model can be extended in several ways. The first would be to allow for     
players. It would be interesting to see how the tolerated level that induces minimum 
misconduct changes as the number of contestants grows. Gilpatric (2011) finds that when 
the error term,  , is uniformly distributed, the equilibrium level of cheating increases as 
the number of players increases. Assuming a larger population (i.e.,  ), an interesting 
extension would allow for heterogeneity in the value contestants place on misconduct. 
That is, some contestants obtain a higher benefit from engaging in misconduct relative to 
other contestants who obtain a lower benefit, for any level of misconduct. When this 
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heterogeneity is unknown to the tournament organizer, setting the tolerated level that 
minimizes misconduct can be problematic.
18
 For example, if the population mainly 
consists of ‘high’ types and the tournament organizer sets the tolerated level too low, he 
runs the risk of motivating contestants to choose higher levels of  misconduct than they 
would under zero tolerance (e.g.,   set such that       chosen if cheating occurs). 
Similarly, if the population mainly consists of “low” types, the tournament organizer may 
induce these contestants to engage in higher levels of misconduct than they would under 
a lower tolerated level (e.g.,   for a low type is less than   set by the regulator). 
Consequently, the tournament organizer would have to acknowledge that, when setting 
the tolerated level, he faces a distribution of ‘types’.  
In a similar vein, one could model a scenario where the tournament organizer chooses 
the level of tolerance but faces uncertain states of temptation (i.e., the gain from 
misconduct is unknown to the organizer). Suppose the state of temptation is low but the 
organizer does not know this and subsequently chooses a relatively high level of 
tolerance. Then, he induces contestants to choose higher levels of misconduct than they 
otherwise would. However, when the state of the world is characterized by high 
temptation, the level of tolerated misconduct may be below that which would minimize 
misconduct. The organizer must balance these concerns. In my model, the organizer 
knows the state of the world and therefore could tailor the level of tolerance to that which 
minimizes misconduct. With uncertainty, the tournament organizer would have to take 
                                                 
 
18
 If heterogeneity was known to the tournament organizer, he would set a tolerated level specific to each 
type of contestant. 
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into account the probability distribution of different states of the world when choosing 
the optimal tolerated level. 
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CHAPTER 2: CLEAN TECHNOLOGY LICENSING TO 
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS – PRICE VS. QUANTITY 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The ability of a patentholder to license a technology and extract rents has long been 
recognized as the motivation behind innovation investment and diffusion. In this paper, I 
apply the insights from the industrial organization literature on the licensing of a cost-
reducing innovation to the case in which potential licensees are part of a larger polluting 
oligopolistic industry and are faced with either quantity or price emissions regulation. I 
consider the optimal auction policy of the patentholder and determine whether a permit 
system (grandfathered or auctioned) or an emissions tax yields a higher number of 
licenses to be auctioned  (i.e., higher level of diffusion).   
Kneese and Schulze (1975) first acknowledged that such a ‘dynamic efficiency’ 
property ought to be taken into account when assessing the costs and benefits of different 
policy mechanisms.
19
 The recognition that market-based instruments can indirectly 
encourage investment in environmental science and technology has led to a large strand 
of research aimed at ranking alternative policies based on the incentives they provide to 
diffuse existing technologies (see Jaffe et al. (2004) and Requate (2005) for the most 
comprehensive survey of this literature). Although providing tremendous insight into the 
superiority of some instruments, the literature has generally assumed the polluting 
                                                 
 
19
 Dynamic efficiency refers to the long-run effects of policy such as the incentives to invest in research, 
development,  and technology and  in technology adoption/diffusion. This is in contrast to static efficiency 
which is primarily concerned with the short-run effects of policy.  
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industry to be perfectly competitive and/or that the technology is discounted enough (or 
even free) so that any firm that wishes to adopt it can do so (Milliman & Prince, 1989; 
Downing & White, 1986; Jung, Krutilla, & Boyd, 1996; Parry, 1998; Requate & Unold, 
2003). But do the policy rankings change when the polluting industry is oligopolistic and 
when the profit-maximizing behavior of the supply side (i.e., the patentholder) is taken 
into account? Since several polluting industries, such as electricity generation and pulp 
and paper mills, are oligopolistic (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein, Bushnell, & Wolak, 2002; 
Cho & Kim, 2007; Erbas & Abler, 2008), it is important to know if, and understand how, 
such strategic interaction in the output market can affect the dynamic efficiency of 
alternative instruments.  
At the core of any analysis on induced innovation is the notion that regulation 
changes the price of pollution (which is an input into the production process) and 
subsequently firms respond by investing in cost-reducing technology.
20, 21
 Often, models 
take as given perfect diffusion and therefore rank policies on the incentive to invest in 
technology creation (e.g., research, development, and demonstration). To the extent that 
better technology lowers the equilibrium permit price as diffusion occurs, a polluting 
firm’s willingness to pay for the technology falls. Consequently, marginal licensing 
revenues, and thus the incentive to invest, are lower under a permit system relative to a 
tax (Milliman & Prince, 1989; Downing & White, 1986; Jung, Krutilla, & Boyd, 1996; 
                                                 
 
20
 That changes in the price of inputs motivates firms to invest in technology is known as Hicks’s Induced 
Innovation Hypothesis (Hicks, 1932). 
21
 Of course, the firm has other options such as reducing pollution intensive output or paying the 
compliance costs.  
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Parry, 1998; Requate & Unold, 2003; de Vries, 2004).
22
 The same intuition may be 
applied when one considers the incentive to diffuse a given technology to perfectly 
competitive markets - the number of licenses auctioned will be smaller under a permit 
system for the same reasons investment by the innovator is lower. 
However, I assume that the output market is oligopolistic and therefore apply the 
main results found within the industrial organization literature on licensing of cost-
reducing innovations to such imperfectly competitive markets. In particular, I determine 
the level of diffusion of a clean technology when an outside patentholder engages in an 
optimal auction policy.
23
 The existing industrial organization literature has broadly 
modeled licensing in oligopolistic markets but has not studied issues specific to 
environmental policy (Kamien, Oren, & Tauman, 1992; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Sen & 
Tauman, 2007). Technology licensing under an emissions tax can be treated just like any 
licensing of cost-reducing technology since the price of the input (here, pollution) is 
fixed. As firms license the technology they become relatively more efficient compared to 
their unlicensed counterparts. In this regard, the auction policy under an emissions tax 
can be viewed as a ‘benchmark’ case to be compared to the more complex permit 
scenario. On the other hand, when the environmental policy imposed is an aggregate cap 
with a tradable permits market, the supply of pollution rights is perfectly inelastic, in 
contrast to the case of a tax where supply is perfectly elastic. In this case, as more 
                                                 
 
22
 This assumes that the regulator is myopic or that policy is too inflexible to change in response to 
technology changes. 
23
 It has been shown that licensing via an auction dominates a royalty or fixed fee policy when demand is 
linear and the innovator is outside of the producing industry (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 
1986). 
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licenses are issued and a larger share of the market becomes more efficient, the price of 
pollution (permit price)  falls. Unlicensed firms free ride off of this ‘spillover’. The lower 
permit price reduces the value of additional licenses. The additional complexity that is 
inherent under a cap and trade system must be taken into account by the patentholder 
when he is making his decision on how many firms to license to.  
Most relevant to my model is the work by Kamien et al. (1992) that defines a 
‘threshold’ number of licenses required to concentrate the market. If the patentholder 
auctions a number of licenses at (or above) this threshold, unlicensed firms leave the 
market. That is, the patentholder can auction enough licenses so that that the market 
output price falls just below the marginal costs of production for an unlicensed firm.
24
 
Intuitively, under either policy I find that privately optimal diffusion by the 
patentholder depends on the quality of the innovation. Much like Kamien et al. (1992) 
and under a tax, minor innovations are licensed to all firms while major innovations are 
licensed to only a few firms, creating a natural oligopoly. That is, for sufficiently large 
innovations under an emissions tax, the innovator chooses to license to just enough firms 
so that any remaining unlicensed firm exits the market as they cannot profitably compete 
with their relatively more efficient counterparts. In contrast, I find that under a permit 
policy, sufficiently small and sufficiently large innovations are licensed to all firms since 
the possibility of concentration is obsolete. Just as the permit price is a function of the 
number of licensed firms, it is also a function of the quality of the innovation. 
Consequently, for sufficiently large innovations, the equilibrium permit price is driven 
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 Realistically, the cost share attributed to environmental compliance must be large enough to induce a 
firm to shut down.  
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low enough (regardless of the number of firms that license the technology) that 
unlicensed firms can still be profitable and are not driven from the market. Therefore, 
only ‘intermediate’ values of innovation provide the innovator with the opportunity to 
create a natural oligopoly. However, unlike the case of an emissions tax, even if the 
innovator can concentrate the market under a permit, I find that he may choose not to.  
I find that, if it is optimal for the innovator to concentrate the market under either 
policy, that the number of licenses auctioned will be higher under a permit relative to an 
emissions tax. Further, using numerical simulations, I show that the level of diffusion is 
generally higher under cap and trade relative to an  emissions tax, regardless of whether 
concentration takes place. This is an important difference with the conclusions generally 
drawn in models of perfect competition. In these models, the level of diffusion will be 
lower under a permit policy relative to a tax. This is because, when markets are 
oligopolistic and the innovator engages in an optimal auction policy, he tends to 
concentrate the market. However, due to the effects of diffusion on the permit price, it is 
“more difficult” for him to concentrate the market under a permit system. That is, under a 
permit system, the number of licenses required to drive unlicensed firms from the market 
is higher than with a tax.  
I also determine the social welfare effects of licensing (i.e., the post-licensing 
outcomes versus the pre-licensing outcomes) for each policy. Numerical simulations 
indicate that, generally, changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus are higher 
under a permit policy relative to a tax. Environmental damages, on the other hand, are 
smaller under an emissions tax. This is because, as the number of clean firms in the 
market rises, aggregate emissions tend to fall under the fixed tax, whereas aggregate 
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emissions remain fixed at the chosen policy level. In aggregate, the change in total social 
welfare tends to be higher (albeit slightly) under a permit policy relative to a tax.   
Importantly, prior to any licensing, the environmental policy is set such that the tax 
and cap are equivalent (i.e., they yield an identical price of emissions and identical 
aggregate emissions to each other). The significant difference between the two policies 
originates from the fact that the price of emissions remains fixed under a tax regardless of 
the number of licensed firms while the price of emissions changes under a cap with the 
number of licensed firms. If one considers the market for pollution to be an input market 
(much like a labor market) with firms making up the demand-side, an emission tax 
simply translates into a perfectly elastic supply of pollution. Licensing out a cost-
reducing innovation will shift the demand for pollution downward with the price 
remaining static. In contrast, a cap translates into a perfectly inelastic supply of pollution. 
Consequently, licensing a cost-reducing innovation will, again, shift the demand for 
pollution downward, with the price of the input changing to reach equilibrium. 
2.2 The Model 
 
I model a game of the licensing of a clean technology by an outside innovator (i.e., 
non-producer) to a group of   oligopolistic, polluting firms. Environmental policy, either 
in the form of an emissions tax or permits (grandfathered or auctioned), is established 
prior to any licensing decision and remains fixed.
25
 The game consists of three stages 
                                                 
 
25
 Assuming a static environmental policy is what drives the difference  between the two policies. If the 
regulator were not myopic, or if regulation were flexible, then the policy would be set such that the 
regulator would account for the technology realized by each firm and the price of emissions would 
ultimately be identical under either policy. 
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under either policy. In the first stage, the innovator announces the number of licenses to 
auction that will maximize licensing revenues. In the second stage, all firms 
simultaneously submit a sealed bid for a license. In the third stage, once the auction 
outcome is realized, firms strategically choose production levels to maximize profits. 
Since pollution is a by-product of production, this final stage also determines permits 
demanded. Therefore, under a permit policy, the third stage simultaneously solves the 
output market and permit market equilibria. The game is solved backwards.  
Consider an output market that consists of     firms that produce identical goods 
and compete a la Cournot. They face a downward sloping demand function,       
with      
 
   . Initially, all firms employ a ‘dirty’ technology so that production 
generates firm-specific emissions one-for-one with output (i.e., the emissions to output 
ratio for the dirty technology is normalized to 1). 
An environmental authority has implemented a static policy of either an emissions tax 
or an aggregate emissions cap with a tradable permits market based on the current, dirty 
technology. To better compare the level of diffusion under each policy, I assume a 
benchmark scenario in which the policies are equivalent to one another prior to the 
licensing decision. That is, the policy is such that the permit price prior to licensing and 
the emissions tax are identical. Thus, prior to the start of the game, each firm faces 
marginal costs of    , where   is the marginal cost of production and   is the price of 
emissions. The price of emissions,     represents either the constant marginal tax or the 
equilibrium permit price. It is assumed that       . Note that the equilibrium permit 
price under grandfathered permits is identical to that under auctioned permits. The first 
stage begins with an outside innovator that currently holds a patent to a clean technology 
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which can reduce a firm’s emissions to output ratio to       with      .26  Taken 
as given the environmental policy, the innovator chooses a number of licenses to auction, 
 , where      . Note that I restrict the number of licenses issued to be less than  . 
Else, if    , the policy would be identical to a fixed fee policy where all firms would 
be guaranteed the new technology. From Kamien et al. (1992), it is concluded that an 
auction policy is preferred by the innovator to a fixed fee or royalty policy since the latter 
are dominated by the former in terms of potential innovator revenues. 
In the second stage, each firm takes   as given and simultaneously submits their 
sealed bid,     .27 This bid represents a firm’s willingness to pay for the license.  
In the final stage, all technologies are realized and firms choose production levels, taking 
the price of emissions as given, to maximize own profits.
 28, 29
  Since pollution is a by-
product of production this stage also solves firm-level emissions (or, in the case of a 
permit system, it establishes permit demand) and therefore the equilibrium permit price. 
Consistent with the industrial organization literature, I treat   as a continuous variable to 
better assess comparative statics.  
2.3 Equilibrium Under an Emissions Tax 
 
                                                 
 
26
 In this regard, the new technology represents one which lowers emissions at the source rather than 
reducing marginal abatement costs. 
27
 It is assumed that coordination is not possible so that firms may not collude during the auction.   
28
 The assumption of perfectly competitive permit markets is typical in the existing literature and is often 
rationalized on the basis that the permit market is comprised of geographically distant and smaller output 
markets. Therefore, no one firm can have a significant effect on the permit price. 
29
 Recent attention has been given to the assumption of perfectly competitive permit markets. Most notably 
is Montero (2002a; 2002b) who argues that many permit markets are in fact dominated by large players and 
therefore exhibit market power.  
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The environmental authority sets the emissions tax,  , prior to any licensing decision 
made by the innovator. As such, the tax simply creates a (higher) marginal cost faced by 
all firms and the model under an emissions tax is identical to existing models for which 
an innovator chooses to auction any innovation that reduces constant marginal cost to 
oligopolistic firms. (See, for example, Kamien et al. (1992) or Sen and Tauman (2007).) 
In this section, I simply restate, as applied to an emissions tax, the significant conclusions 
from these existing models.  
Foremost, it is recognized that for sufficiently large innovations, if enough firms are 
auctioned the license, their cost advantage (relative to unlicensed firms) will be sufficient 
to drive all unlicensed firms from the market. That is, for any  , the equilibrium output 
price,     , decreases as some firms become relatively more efficient. Under a tax, the 
marginal cost faced by an unlicensed firm remains fixed at    . Ultimately, so long as 
the innovation is large enough, as   increases, the output price will fall below this 
marginal cost, making it unprofitable for unlicensed firms to remain in the market. When 
the innovation is not large enough, then the relative cost advantage of licensed firms does 
not drive the equilibrium output price below    . 
Thus, so long as the innovation is sufficiently large, there exists a threshold level of 
licenses,   , which represents the minimum number of licenses required to concentrate the 
market (Kamien et al. (1992), Sen and Tauman (2007)). If the innovator chooses to 
license to      ,  then all firms remain in the market with only a portion of them 
holding the license. Else, if      all unlicensed firms drop out of the market and a  -
firm oligopoly is created.  
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Lemma 2.1: (a) Under any fixed Pigouvian emissions tax,    the minimum 
number of licenses required to concentrate the market is       
     
  
.  (b) In 
order for            , the innovation must be sufficiently large,            
where      
     
  
. [See Appendix A for all proofs]. 
 
Lemma 1 provides this threshold in terms of the parameters of the model and 
highlights that in order for concentration to be possible, the innovation must be large 
enough. Else, if       , then all firms remain in the market regardless of how many 
licenses are auctioned. 
The innovator’s objective is to choose a licensing strategy,  , that maximizes his own 
licensing revenues,            where      is the bid received. This bid is simply the 
difference in Cournot profits from having the license and not having the license. From the 
existing literature on the optimal auction policy of a cost-reducing innovation to 
oligopolistic firms, I have the following proposition as applied to an emissions tax: 
 
Proposition 2.1 (emissions tax): Under any fixed Pigouvian emissions tax,    and 
for sufficiently large innovations,           : 
(a) the innovator’s optimal auction policy is to license to exactly      firms; 
    
       . 
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(b) all unlicensed firms leave the market. All remaining firms use the clean 
technology. 
(c) consumer surplus is higher and producer surplus is lower relative to the 
absence of licensing. 
 
Parts (a), (b), and (c) of Proposition 2.1 follow directly from the results in Kamien et 
al. (1992), Katz and Shapiro (1985; 1987), and Sen and Tauman (2007). So long as the 
innovation is sufficiently large to ensure that a relative cost advantage is big enough to 
drive less efficient firms from the market, the innovator will always license to the 
minimum number of firms to create a natural oligopoly. Although the market is smaller, 
all remaining firms now employ the clean technology. The reason why concentration is 
optimal from the innovator’s viewpoint is that, once the market becomes concentrated, he 
has the ability to behave much like a monopolist and can therefore extract entire industry 
rents through his auction. Licensing to more firms beyond       is akin to making the 
market more competitive, which lowers industry profits. Therefore, there is no incentive 
to license to more than       under an emissions tax.  
Regarding (c), once the policy is in place and prior to any licensing, all firms are 
faced with marginal costs of    . As the innovation diffuses across the market, firms 
become relatively more efficient, the equilibrium output price falls and consumers are 
better off. Each firm, however, is worse off than it was before licensing took place. Any 
unlicensed firm now earns zero profits as it does not produce anything. Likewise, 
licensed firms earn Cournot profits but those are paid to the innovator in exchange for the 
license.  
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2.4 Equilibrium Under Permits 
 
In this section I analyze the equilibrium under permits which are either auctioned by 
the government or issued gratis. Unlike the emissions tax, this analysis is more complex 
due to the impact of   on the permit equilibrium price. It has already been stated that as 
the number of licenseholders increases under an emissions tax, the price of emissions,     
remains constant at its pre-specified level. Under permits, however, the number of 
licenses auctioned determines aggregate permit demand and therefore changes the price 
of emissions faced by both clean and dirty firms. That is, under permits, the price of 
emissions is a function of  ,         The innovator, foreseeing equilibrium in the 
permit market, recognizes that his licensing decision affects the permit price and  takes 
this influence into account when making his auction decision.  
2.4.1 Production and Permit Market Equilibrium 
 
Let a subscript l denote one of the   firms that has a license to the clean technology 
while a subscript    denotes one of the       firms with the dirty technology. The 
Cournot equilibrium depends on whether or not enough licenses were auctioned  to 
concentrate the market (Kamien, Oren, & Tauman, 1992; Sen & Tauman, 2007). As 
defined by Sen and Tauman, an innovation is called " -drastic" if   is the minimum 
number of licensed firms required to concentrate the market into a  -firm oligopoly (i.e., 
all unlicensed firms drop out of the market). This occurs when the output price is no 
larger than an unlicensed firm’s marginal costs of production, 
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              [2.1] 
 
where      is, again, the equilibrium permit price as a function of the number of licenses 
issued.
30
 Letting [2.1] hold with equality and solving for   yields the minimum number 
of licenses required to concentrate the market under a permit system,      .   
 
Lemma 2.2: (a) Under any aggregate emissions cap,    the minimum number of 
licenses required to concentrate the market is      
 
               
  (b) In order 
for            , the innovation must not be too small nor too large,   
            where      
            
       
 and      
           
       
 with   
                   .  
 
Proposition 2.2: The minimum number of licenses required to concentrate the 
market under a permit system is larger than that under an emissions tax,      
      
 
                                                 
 
30
 In the industrial organization literature, innovations are typically categorized as ‘drastic’ and ‘non-
drastic’ without regard for the level of diffusion. Generally, a drastic innovation is one for which the license 
holder can become the sole producer in the market. This is in contrast to a non-drastic innovation for which 
a single license holder may become more efficient than his competitors, but not so much so that he 
becomes the sole producer. In this regard, a 1-drastic innovation as it is defined in the current model is 
analogous to a drastic model in the industrial organization literature, but any non-drastic innovation can be 
k-drastic.  
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Lemma 2.2 defines the minimum number of licenses required to concentrate the 
market under a permit system,       It also restricts attention to those innovation levels 
for which concentration is feasible (although not necessarily optimal from the innovator’s 
standpoint). It states that, much like the case under an emissions tax, the innovation must 
be sufficiently large so that the license holders’ relative cost advantage is enough to push 
non-license holders out of the market. Unlike the case of an emissions tax, the innovation 
must not be too large either. This is because a better quality innovation lowers the 
equilibrium permit price. Therefore, significantly large innovations lower the permit price 
enough for non licenseholders to remain in the market, regardless of the number of firms 
that have the license.   
Proposition 2.2 states that it is ‘easier’ to concentrate the market under an emissions 
tax relative to a permit system. Recall that in order to drive unlicensed firms from the 
market the equilibrium market price must fall below the marginal cost faced by an 
unlicensed firm. This marginal cost remains fixed under an emissions tax while it falls 
under a permit.
31
 Thus a larger number of licensed firms under a permit policy is required 
to drive unlicensed firms from the market.  
Then, for a given cap,  , the following are the production equilibria as a function of 
 . The equilibrium market price and aggregate output are  
 
                                                 
 
31
 The equilibrium market price under a permit falls faster  than it does under a tax, owing to the decreasing 
equilibrium permit price. However, this is not enough to make             
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  [2.2] 
 
and 
 
     
 
 
 
 
  
   
     
 
 
          
     
 
               
 
   
                          
  [2.3] 
 
Firm level production is  
 
       
 
   
                                  
 
   
                         
  [2.4] 
 
and 
 
        
 
   
                          
            
  [2.5] 
 
Cournot profits and industry profits are 
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[2.6] 
               
 
              
 
  
 
[2.7] 
and 
 
                       . [2.8] 
 
Since emissions are a byproduct of output, firm-level permit demand,   , and aggregate 
permit demand,      , are 
 
      
 
 
 
     
   
                                  
     
   
                          
  
 
[2.9] 
        
 
   
                          
            
  [2.10] 
 
and 
 
       
                            
                 
  [2.11] 
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The equilibrium permit price is determined by setting aggregate permit demand [2.11] 
equal to the cap,    and solving for  : 
 
     
 
 
 
 
                           
                        
          
 
                  
       
            
  [2.12] 
 
Substituting equation [2.12] for      in equations [2.2] through [2.11] yields the 
production and pollution equilibria for any  . 
Before analyzing the auction policy, I state the following Lemma which discusses 
how the equilibrium output price changes with  . 
 
Lemma 2.3: The equilibrium output  price is a continuous function of   and is 
decreasing in  . 
 
The import of Lemma 3 is that, even in a scenario where the equilibrium permit price is 
increasing, the output price is continuously falling. That is, consider the case for which  
      . From [2.12], it is clear that the as   increases, the equilibrium permit price 
increases. Increasing   beyond       is analogous to increasing the number of buyers 
(demand)  in an input market (permits). Accordingly, as aggregate permit demand shifts 
up, and the supply remains static, the permit price increases. This, of course, places 
upward pressure on the output price. However, Lemma 3 states that this upward pressure 
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is not enough to outweigh the decrease in the market price associated with increasing the 
number of sellers.  
2.4.2 Bid 
 
A firm’s bid,       is the maximum willingness to pay for the license,  
 
                   [2.13] 
 
It is simply the opportunity cost of holding a license, which is the difference in profits 
earned between a license holder and an unlicensed firm.  
 
Lemma 2.4: For        , the bid for a license under permits is decreasing in    
i.e., 
     
  
    
 
Lemma 2.4 states that the payoff from owning the license falls as an additional firm 
attains the license. Consider the choice of the marginal firm deciding between paying for 
the license or not. Ceteris paribus, the level of output for both clean and dirty firms falls 
as more firms become relatively more efficient, 
      
  
   and 
       
  
  , and this 
lowers their profit. However, since a licensed firm has a higher profit than an unlicensed 
firm, the latter has more to lose as   increases. Consequently, the fall in a licensed firm’s 
profit is larger than the fall in an unlicensed firm’s profit, making the bid fall as   
increases. Similarly, as   increases, firms are less willing to pay for the license because 
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of its effect on the permit price. That is, the benefit of holding the license becomes lesser 
since any unlicensed firm can still free ride off of the fall in the permit price. Therefore, 
under a permit system, the bid falls with   not only because of the fall associated directly 
with output but also because one of the benefits of having a license – a lower marginal 
cost – is (costlessly) exploited by unlicensed firms on the permit market. 
2.4.3 Auction Policy 
 
The auction policy of the innovator is to choose   to maximize licensing revenues, 
           where      is defined in [2.13]. I first consider the case in which   
      and then when          For          the patent holder behaves as a sole 
monopolist and extracts entire industry rents.  
 
Lemma 2.5: For        , industry profits are decreasing under a permit system.  
 
Lemma 2.5 states that once the market can become concentrated, industry profits, and 
therefore innovator revenues, decrease if the innovator auctions additional licenses. 
Recall that once        ,  the market output price equals exactly the marginal cost 
faced by a dirty firm. Effectively, licensing to one more firm beyond      , adds an 
additional competitor to the output and permit markets, creating two effects on industry 
profits. First, ‘allowing’ one more firm to compete in the market lowers the equilibrium 
output price. Second, auctioning  one more license above       increases the aggregate 
demand for permits and therefore the equilibrium permit price. Although this increase in 
the permit price places upward pressure on the output price, the direct effect of increased 
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competition on the output price is strong enough to ensure that the output price falls as   
increases above       and so too does industry profits. Therefore, under a permit system, 
the innovator’s problem is reduced to choosing            ]. 
Next consider the patent holder’s decision to license to         so that unlicensed 
firms do remain in the market. Again, the innovator's profits,     , are comprised of the 
  bids he receives           . His objective function is then  
 
   
 
      
                                     
 [2.14] 
 
Unlike the case under an emissions tax, it is not necessarily true that      is 
increasing for all levels of       . As such, it is possible that the solution to [2.14] is 
interior and that the optimum from the innovator’s perspective is to auction a number of 
licenses,     
   below that which would concentrate the market (i.e., a possible solution is 
    
       ).  
 
Lemma 2.6: There exists a function,           
 
 
        
                                           
 
 
                                          such that if 
       then for some                licensing revenues are decreasing for 
some         If       , licensing revenues are increasing in           .  
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Lemma 2.6 emphasizes that licensing revenues are not necessarily increasing for all 
levels of   under permits. This is in stark contrast to the case under an emissions tax in 
which licensing revenues are always increasing for all levels of         Using Lemmas 
[2.5] and [2.6], I state the following proposition,  
 
Proposition 2.3 (permits): Under any fixed aggregate cap,    if         then 
for some              ,  
(a) the innovator’s optimal auction policy is to license to     
       where 
    
  solves                . 
(b) all licensed and unlicensed firms remain in the market with     
  firms 
using the clean technology and        
   firms using the dirty technology. 
(c) consumer surplus is higher and each firm is worse off; each firm is 
relatively more worse off under a grandfathered permit policy relative to an 
auctioned permit policy. 
 
Proposition 2.3 is the main result of this analysis. Importantly,  parts (a) and (b) state 
that under permits, it is not necessarily true that the innovator will choose to concentrate 
the market even when it has the ability to do so. This is in opposition to the case under an 
emissions tax in which, as stated in Proposition 2.1, it is always optimal from the 
innovator’s perspective to behave like a monopolist and extract maximum industry 
profits by concentrating the market at the minimum threshold. The difference stems from 
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the innovator seeing through to the permit market and acknowledging that his licensing 
decision changes the price of emissions, thereby changing the bid he can receive. Under 
permits, an unlicensed firm is able free ride off of the fall in the permit price as the 
number of licenses increases, and therefore is less willing to pay for the innovation. Thus, 
much like the rationale used in the existing environmental economics literature, the 
innovator attempts to keep the permit price artificially high so that the bid (and therefore 
his licensing revenues) remains high. He does this by not concentrating the market, 
effectively keeping aggregate permit demand high by allowing both dirty and clean firms 
to  remain operable.    
Much like the case under an emissions tax, part (c) states that consumers are better off 
relative to the ex-post environmental policy state. Since diffusion of technology has 
lowered the market price, consumer welfare is now higher. Firms may be better off or 
worse off under the permit system. To see, note that any firm earns profits of        
   
      
    where   represents the firm-level number of permits handed out gratis by the 
environmental authority under a grandfathered system. Note that the first term of the 
Cournot profits,        
 , under an auctioned permit policy is identical to that under a 
grandfathered permit system.
32
 Under an auction,    . Thus, it is clear that as   
increases from zero (a ‘pre-licensing’ stage), not only does the term        
  fall, so too 
does        Intuitively,       is of value to a firm that holds it. As   increases, the 
reduction in the permit price also reduces the value of the permits held. 
                                                 
 
32
 This is because, when the firm maximizes its own profit in the Cournot subgame, the term    drops out. 
Likewise, when the innovator is deciding on the optimal level of   , the bid he expects is without the    
term since they cancel each other out.  
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From propositions [2.2] and [2.3] it follows that if the innovator chooses to 
concentrate the market under either policy, the number of licenses auctioned will be 
higher under a permit relative to a tax. 
 
Proposition 2.4: When         the innovator will license to more firms under a 
permit relative to a tax.  
 
Proposition 2.4 states that when a polluting industry consists of imperfectly 
competitive firms engaged in quantity competition, a profit-maximizing outside innovator 
will license to more firms under a permit than under a tax. Most models of perfect 
competition show that an innovator will artificially keep the permit price high by 
restricting the number of licenses relative to a tax. When one assumes an imperfectly 
competitive market and accounts for the profit-maximizing behavior of the innovator, it 
is found that it is best for that innovator to concentrate the market. Since it is ‘more 
difficult’ to do this under a permit policy owing to the reduction in the permit price from 
increases in  , it follows that  the number of licenses auctioned is higher under the 
permit.  
2.5 Numerical Illustration 
 
It is clear from Proposition 2.3 that the optimal license auction under the permit 
depends on the parameters of the model. Therefore, I run numerical simulations to 
illustrate the differential effects that each policy has on the auction policy. In particular, 
my main focus is to show that, for the parameters specified, the level of diffusion under 
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the permit policy is larger than the tax. Further, since determining the welfare effects for 
a permit policy and a tax generally leads to ambiguous results, I also calculate the 
changes in social welfare under each policy.  
2.5.1 Second-best Environmental Policy 
 
The environmental authority chooses policy prior to any innovation and this policy 
remains fixed (i.e., the policymaker neither accounts for the possibility of technology 
development nor changes policy once it is put in place). The regulator's sole objective is 
to maximize social welfare which is additively separable into total surplus less 
environmental damage when technology and diffusion are zero. For simplicity, I assume 
the environmental damage function is linear,        . Then, the social regulator's 
problem is  
 
   
 
                 
 
 
  [2.15] 
 
which yields the following first-order conditions 
 
  
  
                 [2.16] 
 
Further, I can write the firm's problem in terms of emissions with initial technology: 
 
  54 
   
 
                [2.17] 
 
which yields 
  
  
               [2.18] 
 
The optimal tax rate is found by equating [2.16] to [2.18], and solving for  : 
 
   
            
 
  [2.19] 
 
Standard within the literature, the optimal tax rate is less than  marginal damages due 
to the production externalities associated with imperfect competition in the output 
market. Likewise, the socially optimal emissions cap can be found by substituting     into 
[2.18] and solving for  : 
 
          [2.20] 
 
The price of emissions under either policy is identical prior to the licensing decision. 
That is, the equilibrium permit price that would prevail sans licensing is identical to the 
Pigouvian emissions tax. Likewise, the equilibrium level of aggregate emissions under an 
emissions tax is identical to the aggregate cap sans licensing. 
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2.5.2 Specification and Outcomes 
 
That the equilibrium of the model depends on the level of (exogenous) innovation, I 
illustrate such equilibria for varying innovation types – low innovation       , medium 
innovation,       , and high innovation       .  
In what follows, I provide two tables (different parameters specifications) to illustrate 
the importance of the condition function,     , on the outcome of the model. In 
particular, Table 2 shows that for the parameters specified,       can be positive or 
negative in the relevant range of innovation, indicating a scenario for which the innovator 
may optimally choose to concentrate the market under a permit. In contrast, Table 3 
shows that it is never optimal for the innovator to concentrate the market, even if it is 
feasible, under a permit system. I briefly discuss the significance of each table.  
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Table 2: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit (Example 1) 
 
Tax,          
               
 
Cap 
b
,      
                          
           
                              
                   
Low 1.957 1.957 0.647 0.133 0.522 -.300 0.955  2.272 2.272 0.687 0.281 0.562 0.000 0.843 
Med 0.978 0.978 1.300 0.133 1.169 -.975 2.277  1.786 1.786 1.556 0.889 1.431 0.000 2.319 
High 0.559 0.559 2.264 0.133 2.139 -1.99 4.259  7.143 2.004 2.281 3.122 2.185 0.000 4.807 
(a) Note that    ,    ,   , and     are the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, environmental damages, and social 
welfare, respectively, from the outcomes associated with the absence of licensing.  
(b)The function       as defined in Lemma 6  has                and three real roots equal to               and              
Therefore, from Proposition 3, it follows that        
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Table 3: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit (Example 2) 
 
Tax,          
               
 
Cap 
b
,      
                           
           
                              
                   
Low 3.889 3.695 3.159 1.539 1.663 -1.042 4.242  4.412 3.957 3.240 2.411 1.763 0.000 4.174 
Med 1.944 1.944 6.229 1.625 4.800 -4.500 10.925  4.167 3.715 6.061 7.508 4.586 0.000 12.094 
High 1.111 1.111 11.025 1.625 9.525 -9.750 20.900  -- 1.798 6.342 10.270 6.142 0.000 16.412 
a. Note that    ,    ,   , and     are the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, environmental damages, and social welfare, 
respectively, from the outcomes associated with the absence of licensing.  
b. The condition function,       as defined in Lemma 6 has                and one real root equal to     . Therefore, from 
Proposition 3, it follows that if                       
      . 
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Table 2 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes when I assign the following parameters 
to the model:               and    . Using equations [19] and [20],, it 
follows that the environmental authority will set the tax rate equal to          per 
pollution unit. The associated aggregate emissions cap is then    . In Table 3 the 
parameters are specified as               and    . Then, the emissions tax 
rate is          and the equivalent cap being    .  
Consider the tax policy in Table 2 first. Looking at the columns under the tax, first 
note that concentration is feasible so long as the innovation is sufficiently large,   
    . As is expected, the innovator always chooses to concentrate the market (i.e., 
    
       for each level of innovation shown). Relative to what would occur had no 
licensing taken place, consumer surplus is higher as a result of the lower market price. 
Although not presented in the table, each firm is (individually) worse off than it were 
before, but total producer surplus (as measured as industry profits) is higher. Owing to 
environmental policy placing a fixed price on pollution, as more clean firms in the market 
imply lower aggregate emissions (and therefore lower environmental damages). Taking 
all effects as a whole, however, licensing increases social welfare for all levels of 
innovation.
33
  
Next, focusing on the outcomes under the permit system, note that, following Lemma 
2.2, concentration is feasible when the innovation is no smaller than       and no larger 
than     . Again, that the innovation must not be too large follows from the effect of the 
                                                 
 
33
 Note that, consistent with the existing literature, tax revenues are omitted from the social welfare 
function. It is assumed that these payments  represent a lump-sum  transfer from firms to the government. 
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innovation on the permit price. Much like the fact that increasing   lowers the permit 
price, so too does a high quality innovation (even if one firm were licensed the 
technology). The table illustrates Proposition 2.3 nicely. Recall that Proposition 2.3 states 
that there exists a condition function,     , which, if non-negative implies that the 
innovator will choose      and only clean firms remain in the market. Else, he chooses  
    
   
   
, and both types of firms remain in the market. (Refer to Figure 6 in 
Appendix B for a graphical illustration of this).  The numerical example shows that when 
concentration is feasible, the innovator will choose to forego concentrating the market 
when the innovation is sufficiently high (i.e.              ). Consider the following. It 
is not by the innovator’s choice that concentration is not possible when the innovation is 
sufficiently large (i.e., when    
   
). The relative cost advantage of any licensee is just 
not enough to drive non-licensees out of the market since the latter free-ride off of the 
reduction in the permit price from large innovations. Much in the same light, when the 
innovation is large (but not too large so that the concentration is possible), the innovator 
can earn more by keeping the permit price artificially high by not concentrating the 
market. Much like the case under an emissions tax, consumer surplus, producer surplus 
and social welfare are all higher relative to the absence of licensing. Much of the same 
story can be told under a different parameter specification, as observed in Table 3. 
However, the condition function here is such that it is always negative for the relevant 
range of innovation, and as such, the innovator will never choose to concentrate the 
market.  
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In general, the tables show how, when the innovator chooses to concentrate the 
market, he does so at a higher level under a permit policy relative to a tax. Further, the 
changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and social welfare are higher (albeit 
slightly) under the permit policy. 
 To make a comparison amongst the policy instruments, I focus on Table 2 and 
corresponding Figures 3, 4, and 5. The main point of the figures is to illustrate the 
innovator’s maximization problem (licensing revenues as a function of    and to see how 
social welfare changes with     Figure 3 provides graphical comparisons of the 
equilibrium outcomes that occur under an emissions tax (the right column) and a permit 
system (the left column) for the low innovation.  Figures 4 and 5 provide the same 
illustrations but for the medium quality innovation and the high quality innovation, 
respectively. Note that, as read throughout this paper functions of    , are piecewise 
functions. As such, readers should focus on the solid black lines in each of the subsequent 
figures. Further, the threshold   and the innovator’s chosen   , are the vertical dashed 
line and vertical dotted line, respectively. For most parameter specifications, the licensing 
revenue function  and the change in social welfare function as depicted in the figures 
below are fairly typical. As is shown, the optimal    and   under either policy coincide. 
The only difference is when the innovation is so drastic (     , that the innovator 
chooses not to concentrate the market under a permit system.  
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit with Low Innovation  
Permit Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  62 
Figure 4: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit with Medium Innovation  
Permit Tax 
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit with High Innovation  
Permit Tax 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have developed a theoretical model that incorporates both oligopolistic 
behavior in the output market and an outside innovator’s licensing decision with the hope 
of assessing whether or not a permit system leads to a higher or lower rate of diffusion 
relative to an emissions tax. I found that (i) there exists a range of innovations under 
either policy  for which it is always in the best interest of the innovator to concentrate the 
market and (ii) at least in this range of innovations, the level of diffusion is higher under a 
permit policy relative to a tax. Furthermore, consistent with the existing literature, the 
number of licenses auctioned is inversely related to the quality of the innovation. 
Numerical simulations provide support that the number of licenses auctioned is higher 
under the permit policy. Depending on the parameters specified, the change in social 
welfare may be higher or lower for either policy. Although the change in producer 
surplus and the consumer surplus tend to be higher under the permit policy, 
environmental damages are certainly lower under an emissions tax.  
There are several limitations. The model largely represents a polluting industry in 
which a firm’s environmental compliance costs are a major proportion of its total costs. 
Further, any differences in the optimal auction under either environmental policy is 
driven by the differences in the price of emissions. Here, as the number of licensees 
increases, it creates a ‘wedge’ between the tax and the permit price, which effectively 
differentiates the optimal auction under the permit policy relative to the tax.  Lastly, it is 
assumed that each firm has market power in the product market but only constitutes a 
small portion (or is geographically dispersed enough) to have no affect on  permit price. 
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A natural extension would allow these firms to have market power in both the permit and 
output markets (see Montero (2002a; 2002b) for a discussion of this).  
However, what I consider most important from the findings is that it is crucial that 
models that prescribe environmental policy ought to take into account the supply side of 
technology and account for varying market structures. Although the current study is not 
meant to prescribe policy, it does provide insight into these two important issues. First, 
by endogenizing the licensing decision of the technology supplier it was shown that type 
of environmental policy imposed can have differential effects on the level of technology 
diffusion. Second, modeling the regulated market as an oligopoly, one gets away from 
using the idealized concept of perfect competition and allows more realistic, strategic 
behavior to take place.  
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CHAPTER 3: A MODEL OF ENTRY WITH CLEAN TECHNOLOGY 
LICENSING  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, I modeled the innovator’s optimal licensing decision to a fixed number, 
 , of potential buyers. I found that, under an emissions tax, it is always optimal for the 
innovator to concentrate the market. In contrast, dependent on the level of innovation, the 
innovator may or may not choose to concentrate the market under a permit system; 
indicating that for at least some types of innovation, ‘diffusion’ of a clean technology 
may be higher under a permit than it is under a tax when the polluting industry is 
oligopolistic. As an extension to the model developed in Chapter 2, this chapter aims to 
determine the innovator’s optimal licensing decision when free entry exists. That is, when 
making his decision, the innovator must now account for the fact that there are a 
potentially limitless number of ‘dirty’ or ‘non-licensed’ firms that will compete in the 
market.  Is it the case that the innovator will auction a number of licenses such that the 
only firms that enter are those with the license or will is the auction policy such that both 
types of firms enter? How does the equilibria compare under a permit versus a tax?  
Therefore, in this chapter, I determine the free-entry equilibrium that exists under a 
permit policy and a tax and endogenize the auction policy of the innovator.  An important 
result is that, under an auction policy, firms with different ‘types’ of technologies may 
both exist in equilibrium. The existing literature that examines Cournot entry/exit models 
in which technology types are exogenously given conclude that a firm that is relatively 
more efficient will prevail in equilibrium  (Ohkawa, Makoto, Nakanishi, & Kazuharu, 
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2005). In the present model, it is found when a cost-reducing innovation is auctioned 
potential licensees  bid up the price of a license to a point where their average total cost 
of production is equal to that of the non-licensee, and the price in the market. 
Consequently, an outcome in which heterogeneous firms exists in equilibrium is a 
possibility. Furthermore, it is found that this model produces results analogous to those 
when the number of total firms is exogenous (‘fixed   model’). Under an emissions tax, 
the innovator chooses to auction just enough licenses so that non-licensees do not have an 
incentive to enter. Under a permit, he licenses to no more than an analogous threshold, 
and possibly less. When he licenses to a sufficiently small number of firms, both types 
exist in equilibrium.  
3.2 The Model 
 
Consider a homogenous good, free-entry oligopoly where the production of the good 
creates costly emissions which are regulated by an environmental authority through an 
emissions tax,  , or a permit policy with aggregate cap,     Market demand is given by 
      with     
 
    and firms compete a la Cournot.  
Let an outside innovator own a patent over a clean emissions technology, which 
reduces the rate of firm-level emissions attributed to final goods production. Free entry 
by a potentially limitless number of dirty entrants (“non-licensees”),       is possible, 
while the number of clean entrants (“licensees”),    is fixed by the innovator through an 
auction policy.  
Therefore, a firm will enter as a licensee by obtaining a license in the auction and will 
subsequently face marginal costs of         , with       representing the 
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innovation. Else, it may enter as a non-licensee and face marginal costs of    . 
Importantly, the price of emissions,    depends on the environmental policy. Under a 
fixed emissions tax, the price is independent of the number of firms that enter the market 
and is therefore fixed at  . Under a permit policy, the price is the equilibrium permit price 
and is therefore dependent on the number of firms that enter,           . Both firms 
face identical fixed production costs,  . 
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the innovator announces the number of 
licenses,    to be auctioned through a first-price sealed-bid auction. Second, once   is 
announced, each potential entrant simultaneously offers its bid with the   highest bidders 
winning. Because all potential entrants are identical prior to the auction, they will submit 
identical bids and ultimately a random tie breaking process determines which firms 
obtain the license. Only those entrants that win a license pay the bid. A potential entrant 
that does not obtain a license may enter as a non-licensee. Finally, once all technologies 
are realized, production (and pollution) takes place. The game is solved backwards. Note 
that I treat     and   as continuous for simplicity and to identify the zero profit 
equilibrium of the entry process. 
3.3 Production/Pollution Equilibria 
 
Once all technologies are realized, the equilibrium production output under either 
policy for each type of firm is a function of the number of firms with the license and the 
number of non-licensees: 
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 [3.1] 
 
and 
 
           
         
         
  [3.2] 
 
where again, the price of emissions,    depends on the environmental policy. In particular, 
 
   
            
         
                            
                            
               
  [3.3] 
 
Then, firm-level Cournot profit for each type is  
 
                     
    [3.4] 
 
and  
 
                       
     [3.5] 
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3.4 Entry Equilibrium 
 
Since   is fixed by the innovator, the free-entry equilibrium is determined by the 
zero-profit condition of a non-licensee.
34
 It states that an operating non-licensee is 
earning non-negative profits and that the entry of an additional non-licensee would yield 
to it negative profits. This entry/exit condition is given by [EC.1], 
 
                               [EC.1] 
 
Substituting into               , equations [3.2], [3.3], and [3.5], and solving for 
    identifies the free entry equilibrium number of non-licensees as a function of    under 
each policy 
 
            
        
  
    
     
  
  [3.6] 
and  
 
                                                 
 
34
 In a recent paper by Götz (2005), the author acknowledges that when two types of firms are potential 
entrants into the market, the entry conditions should be complemented with ‘no-switching’ conditions. 
These conditions state that a firm-type, once it has entered the market, does not have an incentive to switch 
technologies. In the present model, non-licensees cannot switch since they have no access to the innovation 
and licensees do not switch since, in equilibrium, they would earn lower profits from doing so under an 
auction policy. Thus, the no-switching conditions do not apply in the auction case and are therefore 
omitted.  
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  [3.7] 
 
Equation [3.6] yields all combinations of   and     that  yield the non-licensee zero-
profit under an emissions tax. Likewise, [3.7] yields those combinations under a permit 
policy.
35
 Figure 6 illustrates the zero-profit conditions under each policy (i.e., equations 
[3.6] and [3.7]). Coordinates that lie below the zero-profit line indicate positive profit 
while coordinates that lie above the zero profit-line indicate negative profit.
36
  
For a given  , an entry decision by a non-licensee is represented as a movement 
upward that is parallel to the vertical axis. Let    with           denote the horizontal 
intercepts under a tax and permit policy, respectively. Then, under each policy, for any 
     non-licensees will enter until they ‘reach’ the zero-profit line. Any further entry is 
met with negative profits. For any     , non-licensees will never enter as it is not 
profitable to do so. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 state the potential entry equilibria for each 
policy.
37
  
 
                                                 
 
35
 That is, equation [3.7] takes into account the equilibrium permit price. 
36
 That the slopes of each zero-profit condition are different stem from the effects of    and     on the 
equilibrium permit price,         . The reduction in    that is required to maintain zero-profit as   
increases under the permit is less than the reduction required under a tax. Specifically, the zero-profit 
condition under a tax is decreasing at a constant rate whereas, under the permit, it decreases at an 
increasing rate,  
        
   
 
                          
          
  . 
37
 This is considered a “potential” equilibrium since the true equilibrium depends on the optimal decision 
making of the innovator. 
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Lemma 3.1 (tax): If        
          
     
, both types of firms may exist in 
equilibrium under an auction policy where the number of non-licensees that enter 
in equilibrium is given by           Else, if         
             
  
 , then a 
symmetric equilibrium exists in which only licensees enter. [See Appendix A for 
all proofs.] 
 
Lemma 3.2 (permit): Under a permit, if        
 
                        
, 
then both types of firms may exist in equilibrium under an auction policy where 
the number of non-licensees that enter in equilibrium is given by          Else, if 
  
        
        
        
       
           
        
        
     
Figure 6: Non-licensee's Zero-profit Condition - Tax versus Permit 
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 , then a symmetric equilibrium exists in which only licensees 
enter. 
 
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 state that there exist two possible equilibrium, dependent on the 
auction policy of the innovator. Under either policy, when the number of licenses 
auctioned is sufficiently small, non-licensees enter the market. On the other hand, if the 
number of licenses auctioned is large enough, entry by even a single non-licensee is 
effectively deterred. This is because, as   increases, the market price that would prevail 
eventually falls below the average total cost of the non-licensee. That   is bounded from 
above to ensure a symmetric equilibrium implies that a licensee would earn negative 
profits if the innovator were to license to too many firms. Figure 7 illustrates Lemmas 3.1 
and 3.2. 
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3.5 The Bid 
 
A potential entrant’s maximum willingness to pay is equal to the maximum value of 
the innovation. Therefore, the bid offered is the difference between the Cournot profits 
earned from owning a license relative to entering as a dirty firm. Under either policy, the 
bid can be expressed as  
 
                               [3.8] 
 
Equation [3.8] states that a potential entrant is willing to bid up to an amount such that it 
were to earn the profits of a non-licensee (i.e., zero). This states that each potential 
Figure 7: Entry Equilibria as dependent on   – Tax versus Permit 
       
           
asymmetric 
equilibria possible 
symmetric 
equilibria possible 
       
        
asymmetric 
equilibria possible 
symmetric 
equilibria possible 
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entrant submits a bid such that its own average total costs of production are equal to the 
price in the market.
38
  
 
Proposition 3.1: When      for            a potential entrant offers a bid 
such that the average total costs of each type of firm are identical to the market 
price. When         the bid offered is such that the average total cost of the 
licensee is equal to the market price.  
 
Proposition 3.1 states that, under an auction, both types of firms end up with zero profit 
in equilibrium. The bid that is ultimately paid by the licensee reduces its profits to the 
same profits that a non-licensee would earn, regardless of the   chosen by the innovator.  
3.6 Innovator’s Problem  
 
The innovator’s problem is to maximize licensing revenues with respect to  . His 
licensing revenues,          are comprised of the   bids received multiplied by the bid 
itself,         , which can be written as  
 
          
                       
          
    
       
        
 [3.9] 
 
                                                 
 
38
 As stated earlier, since all firms are ex-ante symmetric, they each bid an identical value equal to [3.8]. 
The   firms that obtain the license are determined by a random tie breaking process.  
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In what follows, I differentiate between the innovator’s problem under an emissions tax 
and the permit policy. 
3.6.1 Emissions Tax 
 
Under an emissions tax, the innovator’s licensing revenue function,         , can be 
written as 
 
     
 
 
 
 
              
 
    
   
    
     
 
 
   
  
         
               
  [3.10] 
 
 
It is clear from [3.10] that the licensing revenue function is a linear function of   when 
       and is decreasing for    . Consequently, the maximum occurs at     .
39
 
 
Proposition 3.2: In a free entry equilibrium in which the number of potential non-
licensees is infinite, an innovator will optimally auction     
        licenses. 
The equilibrium number of firms in the market will be     
          
3.6.2 Permit Policy 
 
Under a permit policy, licensing revenues can be written as  
 
                                                 
 
39
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  [3.11] 
 
 
It is clear from [3.11] that licensing revenues are decreasing in   when       . 
Therefore, the number of licenses auctioned will be no more than     . Whereas the 
licensing revenue function under an emissions tax for the asymmetric equilibrium was 
decreasing in  , it may or may not decrease under the permit policy. Evaluating the 
marginal licensing revenue function for         at     , gives insight into the optimal 
decision of the innovator,  
 
 
  
   
  
 
      
 
        
 
                   
 
        
 
 
 
    [3.12] 
 
Thus, it is optimal for the innovator to choose      
       if [3.12] is negative. Else, it 
is optimal to choose     
      . Some conclusions about the effects of the permit 
market can be drawn from the equation. First, note that the innovator is more likely to 
choose     
       when either the emissions cap is large or the innovation is 
sufficiently drastic. Ceteris paribus, increasing the cap or the innovation would lower the 
permit price in the market. It has already been discussed that one strategy for the 
innovator is to keep the permit price artificially high as to negate any loss in value of 
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holding a license.  That is, recall that any type of firm that operates garners the rewards of 
a falling permit price, whether they have the innovation or not. Consequently, this 
reduction in the permit price lowers the value of the innovation and the bid received falls. 
The innovator can mitigate some of this by inducing non-licensees to enter the market 
and to bid up the price of a permit.  
3.7 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, a model of free entry/exit under an auction policy was presented. In it, 
the licensee set a fixed number of licenses of a clean technology to be auctioned to a 
potentially infinite pool of market entrants. The results are analogous to those in Chapter 
2 in which the number of firms in the market is fixed.  
Under an emissions tax, an equilibrium exists in which the innovator licenses to just 
enough firms to make entry by non-licensees unprofitable. As is the case under the fixed 
n model, each licensee yields positive profits in production, the value of which is 
awarded to the innovator in the form of a bid. Further, recall that in the fixed n model 
under an emissions tax, that the innovation needed to be sufficiently drastic in order for 
the innovator to be able to concentrate the market. Else, the relative cost advantage of a 
licensee is not enough to drive non-licensees from the market. Thus, it was either the case 
that for sufficiently small innovations, complete diffusion occurred or, for sufficiently 
large innovations, the innovator’s auction policy was such that it induced exit. In the end, 
all firms that remained in the market were licensees. Quite similarly, in the free entry 
model, complete diffusion occurs for any innovation level. The difference between the 
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two is that, in the entry model, the innovator deters entry by non-licensees whereas he 
induced exit by non-licensees in the fixed n model. 
Under an emissions cap, the innovator still faces the same ‘dilemma’ as he would 
under the fixed n model. Foreseeing equilibrium in the permit market, the innovator must 
consider the effects his licensing decision has on the permit price. In this model, a 
potentially limitless number of non-licensees can enter the market. This has two effects – 
it drives the profits earned by any licensee firm down due to more competition. On the 
other hand, more non-licensees implies a higher permit price. This higher permit price 
increases the value of the license. As was concluded for the case of the permit, it is not 
unambiguous whether the innovator will decide to choose      so that only licensees will 
enter and operate, or        so that both types operate.   
In relative terms, if the innovator decides to ‘deter’ entry by non-licensees under 
either policy, than he would license to more firms under the permit. This is strictly due to 
the effect of the permit price on a non-licensee’s profits. Recall that      is determined 
where the profits for a non-licensee are no longer positive. As k increases, a non-
licensee’s profits fall less than they would under an equivalent tax.  
Comparing to the fixed   model, it is the case that the number of firms that end up in 
equilibrium under the free entry model will be lower. This is due to the fixed costs 
incurred by both types of firms. As was shown, as the fixed cost approaches zero, the 
optimal auction policy under the  fixed   model and the entry game are identical.   
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS 
 
Proposition 1.1 
 
(a) Conditions for  :  It is a dominant strategy for player   to choose   when the 
expected payoffs from choosing   are larger than choosing malfeasance, regardless of 
what action    chooses. Therefore, if –   chooses the tolerated level, the expected 
payoff of player   choosing   must be greater than of player   choosing   : 
                 . This corresponds to condition                     . 
Likewise, if –   were to engage in malfeasance, then the expected payoff of player   
choosing   must be greater than of player   choosing   :                     . 
This corresponds to         
                    . Since         
  
 , it follows that that the constraint                      is more restrictive. 
The minimum level of tolerance required to induce the symmetric tolerance 
equilibrium,    , is implicitly defined in                     . To ensure that 
  is the minimum tolerated level that motivates the symmetric tolerance equilibrium, 
note that an epsilon increase in   would decrease the right hand side of the inequality 
by                    
   
  
            
   
  
       , where it is 
calculated directly from the first-order conditions in [1.6] that   
   
  
  , making 
the constraint more likely to hold.  
 
(b) Conditions for  :  It is a dominant strategy for player   engage in malfeasance 
when the expected payoffs are larger than choosing the tolerated level, regardless of 
what action    chooses. Therefore, if –   chooses the tolerated level, the expected 
payoff of player   choosing    must be greater than player   choosing   :           
       . This corresponds to condition                     . Likewise, if –   
were to engage in malfeasance, then the expected payoff of player   choosing    must 
be greater than player   choosing   :                     . This corresponds to 
        
                    . Since         
   , it follows that that 
the constraint         
                     is more restrictive. The 
maximum level of tolerance required to induce the symmetric malfeasance 
equilibrium,   , is implicitly defined in         
                    . To 
ensure that   is the maximum tolerated level that motivates the symmetric 
malfeasance equilibrium, note that an epsilon increase in   would decrease the right 
hand side of the inequality by 
                   
   
  
            
   
  
       , where it is calculated 
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directly from the first-order conditions in [1.6] that   
   
  
  , making the 
constraint less likely to hold.  
 
(c) It follows from (a) and (b) that    . Let          and         . It has been 
established that   solves          
                      and    solves 
                    . The left-hand side of the first condition is larger than 
the left-hand side of the second condition, which implies that 
          
          
 
       
       
, 
which is never true when        To see, suppose      , then the left hand side of 
the inequality would be less than one and,  since                           
            which means the right-hand side of the inequality would be greater 
than one. Therefore, if      , then  
          
          
 
       
       
, which contradicts the 
conditions defined by the tolerance threshold levels. Now suppose      , then the 
left-hand side of the inequality would be greater than one, and         
        since                . 
 
Proposition 1.2 
 
Suppose      so that the equilibrium is   . Now suppose the tournament organizer 
sets tolerance slightly below    so that        . Is it still a best response for player 
   to choose   ? Ceteris paribus, a deviation from   to   reduces the probability of 
ranking first from      to                  but in turn reduces the 
probability of getting detected if audited from       to  . In turn, player   could earn 
                                 rather than              
      
          , a difference of                       
      
 
 
 . Since 
         , it is a best response for player   to choose  . Similarly, is it a best 
response for player –   to continue to engage in malfeasance given that   will choose 
 ? Given that player    chooses  , player –   she will re-optimize and choose    if she 
decides to engage in malfeasance. Therefore, it is a best response for player –   to also 
choose the  tolerated level if the expected payoffs are larger than the expected payoffs 
from choosing   ,                   which simplifies to         
                   which is true when    . Therefore, there exists      
   that induces the symmetric tolerance equilibrium, so long as      .  
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Lemma 1.1 
  
The proof proceeds in several steps.  
 
(a) Recall that conditions       and        simultaneously define    and   . Let 
           represent the mixing strategy and            represent the first-order 
conditions, where          and         :  
 
          
                                           
                       
             
          
  
       
          
  
   
 
Totally differentiating and putting in matrix form (where the inner arguments are 
suppressed) yields  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
  
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
where 
i. 
  
   
                                             
        
ii. 
  
   
    
           
   
 
          
   
 
          
   
 
        
   
   
          
   
 
        
   
 , where 
        
   
   and where 
  
          
   
        
          
   
    from the first-order conditions 
in       , yields 
  
   
   
           
   
 
 
         
 
  
    
iii. 
  
   
  
          
   
 
          
   
 
 
 
          
 
  
    
iv. 
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v. 
  
   
    
           
  
 
          
  
 
          
  
 
        
  
   
          
  
 
        
  
 , where 
          
  
 
        
  
   and where 
           
  
  
          
  
 
yields 
  
  
   
          
  
                       
vi. 
  
  
   
          
     
       
           
     
, where 
          
     
   so that 
  
  
       
           
     
   
 
Let the determinant of the first matrix be  
  
   
  
   
 
  
   
  
   
 . It is clear from (i) 
through (vi) that the ranking of the misconduct levels determines the sign of 
           
   
, 
          
   
, and 
          
   
. 
 
(b) Proof that 
   
  
   and 
   
  
   when          
 
When           then, 
          
   
  , 
           
   
  , and 
           
   
  . To 
see, from the first-order conditions in [1.6], it is true  
          
   
 
     
   and by the 
concavity of the objective function, it follows that  
          
   
 
     
   when      . 
It follows that 
           
   
  
          
   
  . Using the same logic, it is true that from 
the first-order conditions in [1.5] ,  
           
   
 
         
  , and the concavity of the 
objective function, it follows that  
            
   
 
         
   when      . 
 
Then,  
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with the determinant of the matrix being negative,   
  
   
  
   
 
  
   
  
   
  . 
 
Using Cramer’s Rule, one obtains 
  
   
  
 
 
 
          
  
               
           
   
    
 
and  
   
  
 
 
 
        
           
     
    
 
 
          
  
 
          
   
 
          
   
     
 
(c) Proof that 
   
  
   and 
   
  
   when          
 
When      , then  
          
   
   and 
           
   
  .From the first-order 
conditions in [1.6], it is true that  
          
   
 
     
   and by the concavity of the 
objective function, it follows that  
          
   
 
     
   when      . It follows that 
           
   
  
          
   
  . Using the same logic, it is true that from the first-order 
conditions in [1.5]  
           
   
 
         
   and the concavity of the objective 
function, it follows that  
            
   
 
         
   when      . 
Then,  
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with the determinant of the matrix being negative   
  
   
  
   
 
  
   
  
   
  . 
 
Using Cramer’s Rule, it follows that 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
          
  
              
           
     
           
   
    
 
   
  
 
 
 
        
           
     
    
 
 
          
  
 
          
   
 
          
   
     
 
The proof of the sign of 
   
  
 deserves more attention. Suppose 
   
  
  . Then, 
dividing each side by the denominator,  
 
       
           
     
    
 
 
          
  
 
          
   
 
          
   
    
 
Recall that  
  
    
 
   
           
    
       
            
    
 
  
          
   
 
          
   
   
           
   
 
 
Substituting this into the condition yields 
 
       
           
      
    
 
 
          
   
 
          
   
 
          
   
 
 
    
 
   
           
    
       
            
    
 
  
          
   
 
          
   
   
           
   
 
 
Upon rearrangement,  
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Since 
           
     
             
           
          and 
           
   
  
                      
           
             , it follows that 
           
     
 
           
   
     
           
               . This makes 
the term in the parentheses on the left-hand side non-positive, making the left-hand 
side positive. Since the right-hand side is negative, the condition does not hold and 
   
  
  . 
 
Lemma  2.1 
 
(a) The market becomes concentrated once the equilibrium output price falls below 
the marginal cost of an unlicensed firm, where the price under an emissions tax is 
given by         
 
   
       
 
 
       
     
 
   when all firms remain in 
the market. Setting this equal to     and solving for   yields       
     
  
. That 
      is the minimum number of licenses needed to concentrate the market requires 
that the equilibrium output price continues to decrease (or at least not increase) as   
increases beyond       The equilibrium output price becomes         
 
   
                once the market becomes concentrated. Taking the 
derivative with respect to   yields 
        
  
 
             
      
  . 
 (b)  All that is required is that       
     
  
  . Solving for   yields 
     
  
   
      
   
Proposition 2.1 (emissions tax) 
 
Proof follows directly from Kamien et al. (1992) 
 
Lemma 2.2 
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(a)  It is sufficient to show that for       , the equilibrium output price remains at 
or below the marginal cost of a non-licensee,                     . Taking 
the derivative of the permit price [2.12] with respect to   for         shows that 
the permit price is increasing 
     
  
 
 
        
  . Thus, for the inequality      
                to hold, it is suffice to show that      is decreasing in  , 
        . Taking the derivative of the output price with respect to   for        
yields 
 
      
                
      
 
      
     
  
  
            
 
Therefore, the permit price must not rise too much, 
  
  
 
               
           
. Plugging in 
for 
  
  
 , it follows that 
        
  
 
                
      
 
 
           
   so long as 
        
               
     
. Upon further inspection, it is clear that the right-hand 
side of the inequality is identical to aggregate emissions demanded,      . Since it 
has already been established that 
  
  
            , it follows that as   increases 
beyond     ,        .  
 
(b) To determine the range of innovations that support the existence of              
note that for          requires that   
     
   
.  Likewise, for         requires that 
the following condition holds,                           which is a 
convex (concave upward) function of   whose vertex is non-positive at 
                       
      
    Setting     and solving for the solutions for   yields 
the range of innovation levels for which        : 
   
                             
       
 
                             
       
  Since 
 
                             
       
 
       
   
, the more restrictive range of innovations 
for which             becomes         
                             
       
      
                             
       
  .  
 
Proposition 2.2 
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Recall that       
     
  
 and       
 
               
.  Then, for             , 
requires that the innovation be sufficiently large:  
 
  
       
     
 
 
The right-hand side is decreasing in  . As such, if the condition holds when   is at its 
maximum, it holds for any   below it. Since, by assumption of the model, the 
environmental authority’s objective is lower aggregate emissions, the maximum the 
cap would be is at the current aggregate pollution level,   
 
   
     . Therefore,  
            so long as 
 
  
 
   
            
       
 
 
The right-hand side is clearly less than 
 
   
 since the second term on the right-hand 
side is less than one. Thus, the condition certainly holds if   
 
   
.  Note that, from 
Lemma 2.2, the relevant range of innovation levels is such that        
 
 
       
      
 
where                        . Then, it is suffice to show that 
 
   
 
 
 
       
      
, which upon rearrangement becomes            , which is 
always true. Therefore, it follows that             . 
 
Lemma 2.3 
 
Plugging in the equilibrium permit price [2.12] into the equilibrium output price [2.2] 
for       ,      
         
 
 
           
                    
. Taking the derivative with respect to   
yields 
 
      
                                          
                       
 
 
Thus,         when the numerator is non-positive. Define the numerator as 
                                               . Note 
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that        and that 
  
  
              
 
 
                  
    .Therefore, the maximum that      can be is at        . Then, it is suffice to 
show that if          , then  
                . Plugging in for      it 
follows that           so long as              . 
 
Lemma 2.4 
 
The bid is the licensee’s Cournot profits less a non-licensee’s Cournot profits, 
                   . Rewriting in terms of output and noting that        
  , it follows that  
 
                  
 
Taking the derivative with respect to   yields 
 
       
  
    
   
  
 
    
  
  
  
  
           
 
 
Lemma 2.5 
 
From Lemma 2.2 it has already been established that the output price falls as   
increases         . Following Sen and Tauman (2007), define industry profits as a 
function of the output price,                                . Taking 
the derivative with respect to   yields  
 
         
  
  
                   
 
which is less than zero if                     . Upon rearrangement and 
noting that                   , it follows that for  
          requires 
that    . Recall that by assumption of the model, the quality of the innovation is 
such that at least one firm is licensed the technology.  
 
Lemma 2.6 
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The proof proceeds in several steps. First, I define the marginal licensing revenue 
function under a permit for         as 
     
  
. Then, I evaluate this function at      . 
If  
     
  
 
       
  , then it is the case that      
        . Else, if  
     
  
 
       
  , it 
is the case that     
        .  
 
The marginal licensing revenue evaluated at       is  
 
      
  
 
      
     
                 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
Where 
           
 
 
          
 
 
       
             
 
 
                   
            
 
 
   
 
 
                      
 
The sign of      will  be the sign of  
     
  
 
      
 in question. To see, first note that 
the denominator is positive. That is, the denominator is positive if the following 
condition holds: 
 
                                             
 
The left-hand side negative. To see, note that for the permit price to be non-negative, 
it is such that                            . Since         
                   , it must be that                . Then, solving 
for   , the denominator is positive if 
 
  
                      
                 
 
 
which can be written as 
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which is always true since the right-hand side is greater than one, and by assumption 
of the model, the innovation is always less than one.  Therefore, the sign of 
      
  
 
      
 is the sign of the term   in the numerator. Depending on the parameters 
specified, the function can be either positive or negative.  
 
Proposition 2.3 
 
Parts (a) and (b) follow directly from Lemma 6. The first part of (c) follows from the 
reduction in the market price. To see the effect on a licensee’s profit, observe its 
profit function under a grandfathered permit,          and under an auctioned permit, 
       ,  
 
                                
                            
 
A licensee always makes more profit under a grandfathered permit than an auction in 
equilibrium. To see that a licensee earns less profit post-licensing under either type of 
permit policy, note that by construction of the demand and cost functions, the 
Cournot profit for any firm is simply the square of its output.  It has already been 
established that output (and therefore profit) is decreasing in  . As such, a licensee is 
worse off, under either permit policy, relative to the absence of licensing. Further, the 
profit loss under a grandfathered permit is larger than under an auction since the value 
of a permit handed out gratis is now smaller.  The same logic can be applied to the 
profit change of a non-licensee.  
 
Proposition 2.4 
 
Follows from Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 2.6. 
 
Lemma 3.1 
 
Define      
          
     
 and      
 
                        
. Then, under an 
auction policy, if      for           an asymmetric equilibrium is possible in 
which both types of firms may exist. Else, if     , a symmetric equilibrium is 
possible in which only licensees may exist. [See Appendix A for all proofs.] 
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Consider initially the possible equilibria under an emissions tax. Then, the proof 
proceeds in several steps. I first show that an asymmetric equilibria is possible in 
which both types of firms exist so long as        
          
     
. Then, I show that 
the symmetric equilibria in which only licensees exist is a possible outcome when 
       
 
The zero-profit condition, [EC.1], states that the equilibrium number of non-licensees 
that can exist in equilibrium as a function of   is given in [3.6] 
 
            
        
  
    
     
  
  [3.6] 
 
Therefore, only combinations of   and     that solve [3.6] are possible equilibria. It is 
easy to verify that as   increases,         falls in order to maintain equilibrium, 
           
  
  
     
  
. Eventually,          approaches zero which is simply the 
horizontal intercept of [3.6]. It represents the fact that for sufficiently large  , it is 
never profitable for (even an epsilon) non-licensee to enter the market.  
  
Next, I show the symmetric equilibrium. It has already been established that if 
      , then only licensees will exist. To see that   
             
     
 note that for a 
the licensee to make positive profit requires that              . Substituting in 
equation [3.3], it follows that   
             
     
 for the licensee to make positive 
profit. Any   greater than this and the Cournot production profits,            is not 
enough to outweigh the production fixed cost.  
 
Lemma 3.2 
 
The zero-profit condition, [EC.1], states that the equilibrium number of non-licensees 
that can exist in equilibrium as a function of   is given in [3.7] 
 
           
                             
         
 [3.7] 
 
Therefore, only combinations of   and     that solve [3.7] are possible equilibria 
under the permit. It is easy to verify that as   increases,         falls in order to 
  98 
maintain equilibrium, 
          
  
  
                       
          
. Eventually,          
approaches zero which is simply the horizontal intercept of [3.7]. It represents the fact 
that for sufficiently large  , it is never profitable for (even an epsilon) non-licensee to 
enter the market.  
  
Next, I show the symmetric equilibrium. It has already been established that if 
      , then only licensees will exist. To see that   
 
       
 note that for a the 
licensee to make positive profit requires that              . Substituting in 
equation [3.3], it follows that   
 
       
 for the licensee to make positive profit. 
Any   greater than this and the Cournot production profits,            is not enough 
to outweigh the production fixed cost.  
 
Proposition 3.1 
 
A potential entrant offers its maximum willingness to pay for the license, which is the 
difference in the Cournot profits earned by a licensee and a non-licensee. When 
    , the bid paid is                      and each licensee will earn the same 
as the non-licensee,                             .  
 
The following is true for any price of emissions. To see that in the  asymmetric 
equilibrium the bid is such that the average total costs of each firm are identical and 
equal to the market price note that (i) a non-licensee produces    and faces average 
total costs of       , (ii) by the entry condition, the market price is equal to 
      , and (iii) the bid offered by the licensee is equal to           . Then, 
the average total cost of a licensee is  
 
                 
               
     
 
 
For the average costs of the two types of firms to be identical requires that  
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In the symmetric equilibrium each -licensee offers a bid equal to the Cournot profit it 
could earn as a licensee,                       
 
  , earning end profits 
of                  . Therefore, the bid offered is such that Cournot profits 
are zero, which is analogous to saying that the average total cost of production is 
equal to the market price. 
 
 
Proposition 3.2 
 
That     
       follows directly from [3.10] and the discussion that proceeds it. 
Refer to proof of Proposition 3.1 to see that the price in the market is equal to the 
average total costs  
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
    
       
Concentration feasible 
     
            
     
            
    
           
       
Figure 8: An Illustration of Proposition 2.3 (Example 1) 
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